The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
107.
Mr Howard
recommended next steps to Mr Hoon on
24 April.48
He explained
that
the
relevant US agencies:
•
agreed that
the discovery of WMD was a “high and urgent policy
priority”;
•
recognised
the political, presentational and legal pressures for the
UK;
•
agreed that
the ISG would be “the primary executive vehicle” for detection
work
once it was
fully established by the end of May;
•
agreed the
need to redirect US and UK resources in theatre while the ISG
was
still
building its capacity;
•
accepted
“the political desirability of third party validation” of finds and
did “not
appear to
rule out the involvement of the UN in this process”, although there
was
“considerable
hostility to UNMOVIC in its present form”; and
•
agreed the
need for co-ordinated public handling and expectation
management.
108.
In relation to
UK support for the ISG, Mr Howard recommended that
Mr Hoon:
•
accede to
the US request to provide a Chief of Staff to Maj Gen
Dayton;
•
agree, as a
first step, to assign certain assets already in Iraq to the ISG for
an
initial
period of six months and for deployment across Iraq:
{{12
personnel from the DIS Battlefield Intelligence Recovery
Team;
{{eight
personnel from the Joint Forces Interrogation Team;
{{eight
personnel from 7630 (HUMINT) Squadron;
{{four
personnel from Document Exploitation teams; and
•
agree that
officials should pursue additional steps to enhance the
UK
contribution,
including the urgent recruitment and redeployment of
WMD
experts.
109.
Lieutenant
General Andrew Ridgway, who had succeeded AM Sir Joe French
as
CDI,
informed Lt Gen Reith that Mr Hoon had approved
Mr Howard’s recommendations.49
110.
Lt Gen
Ridgway explained that a revised Execute Directive for Op TELIC
would
reflect the
need for activity in theatre to match the very high priority
attached to discovery
of
WMD.50
In the
meantime, he requested Lt Gen Reith’s support in ensuring all
were
aware of
the importance attached to the work.
111.
On
25 April, Mr Howard informed Vice Admiral Lowell E
Jacoby, Director of the DIA,
that
Mr Hoon had approved the broad outline of the UK contribution
to the ISG.51
It
would
include a
Chief of Staff for Maj Gen Dayton and, as a first step, for an
initial period of six
months and
for theatre-wide deployment, 30-40 personnel
comprising:
48
Minute
Howard to PS/SofS [MOD], 24 April 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Detection
and Elimination’.
49
Minute CDI
to CJO, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Detection and
Elimination’.
50
General Sir
Michael Walker, Chief of the Defence Staff, issued an addition to
the Execute Directive
relating to
the ISG on 18 June.
51
Letter
Howard to Jacoby, 25 April 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group: UK
Contribution’.
446