The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
contracts
to rebuild infrastructure had to be let much more
quickly;
•
the
Coalition’s communications strategy had to be put on a more
energetic
footing;
and
•
in general,
the CPA needed greater administrative capacity.
45.
Mr Blair
proposed a small US/UK team “with one of our people from our
own
circle” to
act as a rapid conduit to the President and himself, enabling them
to clear the
bureaucratic
obstacles immediately.
46.
Mr Blair
concluded his Note by explaining that he would be “going back to
almost a
war
footing” in order to “restore focus” on issues in
Iraq.
47.
On 3 June,
Mr Blair chaired a meeting on Iraq attended by Mr Hoon,
Baroness
Amos (the
International Development Secretary), Sir Michael Jay (FCO
Permanent
Under
Secretary), and No.10 officials.20
48.
Mr Blair
said he had returned from Iraq convinced that “an enormous
amount
needed to
be done”. He told those present that:
•
The CPA
lacked grip and organisation, rather than money or
staff.
•
The UK
should “beef up” its involvement in the CPA.
•
There
should be a White House/No.10 team to work alongside Mr Sawers
and
Ambassador
Bremer.
•
There
should be a strong civilian team in the South.
•
The CPA and
US decision-making processes were too slow – contracts
needed
to be
processed faster.
•
British
companies needed to be energised to take up opportunities in
Iraq.
49.
Mr Blair
also said that he believed Whitehall should go back to a “war
footing” for the
next two to
three months, in order to avoid “losing the peace in
Iraq”.
50.
Following the
meeting, Mr Cannon commissioned a number of papers to be
ready
before a
further meeting on 6 June, including:
•
a list of
10 to 15 outstanding practical issues for Mr Blair to raise
with
President Bush
that would “make a big difference to the people of Iraq if
they
are resolved”;
•
a note from
the FCO on what the UK wanted Mr Vieira de Mello to
do;
•
advice on
how to improve the Iraqi media; and
•
advice on a
high-calibre replacement for Mr Sawers when his term
of
appointment
ended.
20
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 3 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 3
June’.
214