The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
193.
In any
undertaking of this kind, certain fundamental elements are of
vital
importance:
•
the best
possible appreciation of the theatre of operations, including the
political,
cultural
and ethnic background, and the state of society, the economy
and
infrastructure;
•
a
hard-headed assessment of risks;
•
objectives
which are realistic within that context, and if necessary limited –
rather
than
idealistic and based on optimistic assumptions; and
•
allocation
of the resources necessary for the task – both military and
civil.
194.
All of these
elements were lacking in the UK’s approach to its role in
post-conflict
Iraq.
195.
Where
responsibility is to be shared, it is essential to have written
agreement in
advance on
how decision-making and governance will operate within an alliance
or
coalition.
The UK normally acts with allies, as it did in Iraq. Within the
NATO alliance, the
rules and
mechanisms for decision-taking and the sharing of responsibility
have been
developed
over time and are well understood. The Coalition in Iraq, by
contrast, was
an ad hoc
alliance.The UK tried to establish some governance principles in
the MOU
proposed to
the US, but did not press the point. This led the UK into the
uncomfortable
and
unsatisfactory situation of accepting shared responsibility without
the ability to make
a formal
input to the process of decision-making.
196.
As Iraq
showed, the pattern set in the initial stage of an intervention is
crucial. The
maximum
impact needs to be made in the early weeks and months, or
opportunities
missed may
be lost for ever. It is very difficult to recover from a slow or
damaging start.
197.
Ground truth
is vital. Over-optimistic assessments lead to bad decisions.
Senior
decision-makers
– Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, senior officials – must have a flow
of
accurate
and frank reporting. A “can do” attitude is laudably ingrained in
the UK Armed
Forces – a
determination to get on with the job, however difficult the
circumstances – but
this can
prevent ground truth from reaching senior ears. At times, in Iraq,
the bearers
of bad
tidings were not heard. On several occasions, decision-makers
visiting Iraq
(including
the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Chief of the
General Staff)
found the
situation on the ground to be much worse than had been reported to
them.
Effective
audit mechanisms need to be used to counter optimism bias, whether
through
changes in
the culture of reporting, use of multiple channels of information –
internal and
external –
or use of visits.
198.
It is
important to retain a flexible margin of resources – in personnel,
equipment
and
financing – and the ability to change tactics to deal with adverse
developments
on the
ground. In Iraq, that flexibility was lost after the parallel
deployment to Helmand
province in
Afghanistan, which both constrained the supply of equipment (such
as
ISTAR) and
took away the option of an effective reinforcement. Any decision to
deploy
504