3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
200.
The
discussions also covered the scale of the military operations being
examined
by the US
and arrangements for inter‑agency co‑ordination in Washington.
Mr Wright
stressed
the need for “close UK involvement in the work”.
201.
The British
Embassy Washington reported that it would be very difficult
for
President
Bush to do nothing, but it was clear to the main players that they
would
have to
make a convincing case before going ahead with any
action.
202.
Mr Brenton
wrote to Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East and
North
Africa, to
provide a “snapshot of the situation as it now looks here” for a
meeting on Iraq
to be held
on 30 August by Sir Michael Jay, FCO Permanent Under Secretary
(PUS).70
“The public
debate … is now firmly engaged. We have seen contributions
from
practically
every prominent Republican … With the signal exceptions
of
Scowcroft …
and Zinni [General Anthony Zinni, former Commander in
Chief
CENTCOM and
US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace], virtually all
have
endorsed
the idea of military action, subject to various preliminaries (such
as going
through the
UN) to maximise international support. Cheney’s speech … has
further
raised
expectations of an early decision leading to military
action.”
204.
Mr Brenton
described the key points under discussion as:
•
a)
Whether to
do it at all: President
Bush’s public position was that he would
“proceed
‘cautiously and deliberately’ with full consultations of Congress
and
allies, and
that a range of options remained open”.
•
b)
UN
inspections:
Mr James Baker and others had “argued that the US
must
go the UN
route – demanding unfettered inspections (with the expectation,
but
not
certainty, that Saddam will refuse), and the right to take action
to enforce
compliance,
to maximise international support”.
•
c)
Consulting
Congress: The White
House had “made it clear” that it saw “no
legal need
to get Congressional support for military action … But, they have
also
been
briefing that there will be ‘full consultation’ and have not ruled
out seeking
formal
support … if the Administration made an effective case, Congress
was
likely to
support action.”
205.
Mr Brenton
suggested that a number of other considerations continued to
weigh
heavily in
the debate. Those were:
•
the “day
after” question;
70
Letter
Brenton to Chaplin, 29 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
129