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3.2  |  Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil” to Crawford
different” as to justify military action. Without the attacks of 11 September, it was
“doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq”. There was:
“… no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida …
“… Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September.
What has, however, changed is the tolerance of the international community
(especially that of the US), the world having witnessed on September 11 just what
determined evil people can these days perpetrate.”
471.  Addressing the difference between Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Mr Straw wrote:
“By linking these countries together in his ‘axis of evil’ speech, President Bush
implied an identity between them not only in terms of their threat, but also in terms
of the action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of work will now need to be done
to delink the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so much more
justified than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case – that Iraq poses
a unique and present danger – rests on the fact that it:
invaded a neighbour;
has used WMD, and would use them again;
is in breach of nine UNSCRs.”
472.  In relation to the position in international law, Mr Straw wrote:
“That Iraq is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed on it by
the UNSC provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is based on
international law. Indeed, if the argument is to be won, the whole case against Iraq
and in favour (if necessary) of military action needs to be narrated with reference
to the international rule of law.
“We also have better to sequence the explanation of what we are doing and why.
Specifically, we need to concentrate in the early stages on:
making operational the sanctions regime foreshadowed by UNSCR 1382;
demanding the re-admission of weapons inspectors … to operate in a free
and unfettered way …
“… I believe that a demand for the unfettered re-admission of weapons inspectors
is essential, in terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal sanction for any
subsequent military action.
“Legally, there are two potential elephant traps:
(i) regime change per se is no justification for military action; it could form
part of the method of any strategy, but not a goal. Of course, we may want
credibly to assert that regime change is an essential part of the strategy by
471
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