3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
different”
as to justify military action. Without the attacks of 11 September,
it was
“doubtful
that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq”.
There was:
“… no
credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL and Al Qaida …
“…
Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of
11 September.
What has,
however, changed is the tolerance of the international
community
(especially
that of the US), the world having witnessed on September 11 just
what
determined
evil people can these days perpetrate.”
471.
Addressing the
difference between Iraq, Iran and North Korea, Mr Straw
wrote:
“By linking
these countries together in his ‘axis of evil’ speech, President
Bush
implied an
identity between them not only in terms of their threat, but also
in terms
of the
action necessary to deal with the threat. A lot of work will now
need to be done
to delink
the three, and to show why military action against Iraq is so much
more
justified
than against Iran and North Korea. The heart of this case – that
Iraq poses
a unique
and present danger – rests on the fact that it:
•
invaded a
neighbour;
•
has used
WMD, and would use them again;
•
is in
breach of nine UNSCRs.”
472.
In relation to
the position in international law, Mr Straw wrote:
“That Iraq
is in flagrant breach of international legal obligations imposed on
it by
the UNSC
provides us with the core of a strategy, and one which is based
on
international
law. Indeed, if the argument is to be won, the whole case against
Iraq
and in
favour (if necessary) of military action needs to be narrated with
reference
to the
international rule of law.
“We also
have better to sequence the explanation of what we are doing and
why.
Specifically,
we need to concentrate in the early stages on:
•
making
operational the sanctions regime foreshadowed by UNSCR
1382;
•
demanding
the re-admission of weapons inspectors … to operate in a
free
and
unfettered way …
“… I
believe that a demand for the unfettered re-admission of weapons
inspectors
is
essential, in terms of public explanation, and in terms of legal
sanction for any
subsequent
military action.
“Legally,
there are two potential elephant traps:
(i) regime
change per se is no justification for military action; it could
form
part of the
method of any strategy, but not a goal. Of course, we may
want
credibly to
assert that regime change is an essential part of the strategy
by
471