The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
system to
track stock and equipment both into and within theatre – a
requirement
which was
identified in the 1991 Gulf War.”311
588.
In May 2009,
the NAO recognised that the MOD had “made a number of
important
changes” to
its logistic support process since the end of combat operations in
Iraq.312
589.
The MOD’s
existing systems only provided “a limited tracking capability:
a
consignment
is only visible once it passes through a specific point in the
logistics chain,
but cannot
be tracked at all points along the course of its journey”. The NAO
stated that
was
“nonetheless” an improvement compared to the systems in place in
2003.
590.
The NAO
recommended that the MOD should:
“ … further
improve and integrate its logistics information systems,
including
consignment
and asset tracking, so users on operations have visibility over
the
stock
already available at different locations in theatre, can track the
progress of
deliveries
throughout the supply pipeline and see stock availability back in
the
United Kingdom.”
591.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“… I think
the biggest problem we had was with the tracking systems to
actually
ensure we
knew exactly what was where, when; and that consignments
that
were sent
actually arrived in time to be fielded properly. That system was
not
592.
Gen Reith told
the Inquiry:
“There
wasn’t a shortage of equipment in the end. What there was, was an
inability
to track
it. We knew it was in theatre, but some of it we couldn’t
find.”314
593.
ACM Stirrup
told the Inquiry:
“ … I think
it was clear that lack of visibility on what was actually happening
in
theatre was
hampering us, but, of course, even if you have that visibility, you
have
got to
identify what are the real substantive problems, and the real
substantive
problems
were very much to do with asset tracking with knowing where things
were,
so you
could get them to the right place at the right time. In a number of
instances,
the
necessary equipment was in theatre, it just wasn’t in the right
place, and in some
instances,
people didn’t know where it was in theatre.”315
311
Third
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 2003-04,
Lessons of
Iraq, HC57-I,
para 291.
312
National
Audit Office, Support to
High Intensity Operations,
14 May 2009, HC 508.
313
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 73.
314
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 52.
315
Public
hearing, 1 February 2010, page 14.
96