4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
156.
In his memoir,
published in 2012, Mr Straw wrote:
“Earlier in
the summer there had been a mounting and understandable
clamour
for more
and more explanation about why we and the US were now taking
the
threat from
Iraq so much more seriously than we had before 9/11. People
assumed
we must
know much more than we were letting on. Through the CIA
[Central
Intelligence
Agency], SIS and the other agencies, we did … have access to what
we
believed to
be reliable intelligence about Saddam’s continuing intentions in
respect
of his
banned weapons. The mistake we made – on both sides of the Atlantic
– was
to believe
that the best way to respond was to include a declassified summary
of
some of the
intelligence in the dossier.”69
157.
Mr Blair’s
announcement galvanised thinking on the draft Iraq
dossier.
158.
On 2
September, in response to a discussion with Mr Rycroft about
“the need for
a capping
piece for the Iraq dossier currently sitting on the shelf”,
Mr McKane provided
a draft,
which set out “the argument for effective action against Saddam
Hussein”.70
159.
Mr McKane
concluded:
“If you or
David think the draft is worth developing and refining, the next
step would
be for me
to circulate it … We should also, as you and I agreed, be
considering
whether
there is more up to date material which could be incorporated in
the
dossier itself.”
160.
The draft
referred to the general threat from the spread of chemical and
biological
weapons and
stated that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a “particularly
dangerous
example” of
that general threat because of “his track record and his continuing
flouting
of
international norms of behaviour. That is why it is so important to
deal now with the
threat he
represents.”
161.
The draft also
stated:
•
Since 1998,
the UN had “tried repeatedly to persuade Saddam to comply”
with
his
obligations, but he had sought “At every turn … to divert attention
from his
failure to
comply.” The “only reasonable explanation” for that “prevarication”
was
that “he
has something to hide, something he is unwilling to give
up”.
•
“… [W]e
cannot wait for ever for the right answer from Saddam, when all
the
time he is
engaged in work on weapons which could threaten our [sic]
own
population
and certainly the population of his neighbours. If we were to do
so,
particularly
after 11 September, and our patience were to be rewarded
with
another
devastating attack, we would rightly be castigated for our
inaction.”
69
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
70
Minute
McKane to Rycroft, 2 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
143