The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
156.
A member of OD
Sec wrote to Sir David Manning on 30 January with a draft
minute
from Sir
Andrew Turnbull to Mr Blair setting out “on a contingency basis” a
proposal for
“meeting
and briefing arrangements for handling any conflict with
Iraq”.96
The
official
suggested
that Sir David might like to discuss the issue with Mr Blair before
the draft
was
submitted to Sir Andrew.
157.
The draft
minute proposed that, “given the sensitivity of the issues to
be
discussed”,
the “War Cabinet” should be a “very small, informal group” “limited
to
the Foreign
Secretary, the Defence Secretary, CDS, C, John Scarlett plus a
small
Secretariat”.
There was also “a case for including a non-departmental Cabinet
Minister
who is not
quite so close to the action”. The membership could also be
“extended as
necessary on a
case by case basis, if there was
a need to involve any other Minister
(such as
the Attorney General or Development Secretary) in the
discussions”.
“The core
group could be formally constituted as a Cabinet Committee. But
I
recommend
that it be established as an Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee. This
would
help foster
an air of informality and obviate the need to publish any
composition and
terms of
reference.”
159.
The covering
minute to Sir David stated that:
“In terms
of managing the business this is fine. But in the absence of a
formally
constituted
‘War Cabinet’ as we had with Afghanistan, which was the public
face
of decision
taking, could lead to unhelpful speculation about how the conflict
was
being
managed. Other Ministers might also feel excluded. One way round
the
problem
would be for DOP to be convened occasionally (thereby bringing in
Clare
Short and
Gordon Brown) when there is a need for a wider discussion –
perhaps
before
Cabinet each week. This would be in addition to more regular
meetings of
the inner group.”
160.
The draft
minute stated that COBR should be “activated in the immediate
run
up to any
military action, and manned on a 24 hour basis”; and that: “As
during the
Afghanistan
conflict, David Manning would chair official-level meetings (both
in
restricted
and wider formats) to co-ordinate and galvanise Departmental
activity and
to ensure
that you are properly briefed on developments.” A daily
intelligence update,
an
‘Overnight Sitrep’ prepared early each morning “covering the main
international and
military
developments”, and “a more detailed thematic ‘Evening Round-Up’
following the
Afghanistan
model” were also proposed.
96
Minute
Gibbons to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Crisis
Management’.
292