9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
236.
Mr Powell
commended Sir Nigel’s paper as “a serious piece of work” which
made
“some good
points”. He agreed with the proposed next steps but disagreed with
what he
saw as Sir
Nigel’s “dismissal of the red team approach”. Mr Powell
wrote:
“The Red
Team concludes – and no one seriously contests this – that we are
in
danger of
strategic failure in Iraq, with the situation degenerating into
civil war
or even
victory for the terrorists. If this is the case then we have to
rethink our
strategy
and – as important – how we deliver it. The fundamental choice is
between
continuing
as we are with the principal aim of getting our troops out and
handing
over to the
Iraqis next year even though we do not believe that the Iraqi
government
and
security forces will be able to survive alone in the face of the
insurgent threat,
or
alternatively aiming at success (defined below) and making getting
our troops out
next year a
subsidiary aim. Once you think about it, I do not think we can
responsibly
do anything
other than aim at the latter … Nor do I think muddling on is an
option.
We are
losing the support of even those who supported the war, because
they can
see no
light at the end of the tunnel. They think we are incompetent and
have no
plan to
succeed in Iraq. We need a new strategy that people can see and
believe
is leading
to success if we are to maintain public tolerance. That is why we
should
build on
the red team analysis and – to a certain extent – their
recommendations.”
237.
Mr Powell
recommended:
•
More
focused and intensified Sunni outreach, splitting the
“reconcilable” from the
“irreconcilable”
by tackling high unemployment in Sunni regions.
•
Continuing
to pursue Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but without viewing his
death
or capture
as a primary aim in itself because “even when we capture him
the
insurgency
will not be over”.
•
Integrating
the military, political and economic strategies and
operations
because “at
the moment they are running on separate tracks with
separate
commands.
We need a joint taskforce, as the paper recommends, with
one
person in
charge. That person should be Khalilzad and he should be
reporting
back to you
and Bush regularly. It is worth devoting a good deal of your
and
Bush’s time
to getting it right. We need to reduce the length of the
command
and control
system and make it more flexible, so that if you and Bush give
an
instruction
something actually happens on the ground.”
•
Ensuring
that insurgents were not able to re-take cities after MNF
operations –
which meant
both an increase in MNF troops and increasing the
effectiveness
of the ISF.
Mr Powell commented: “Linked to this is the fundamental need,
that
you have
been banging on about for ages, to have properly trained Iraqi
armed
forces and
police. We still don’t have either. Why not? … There is no point
in
carrying on
doing what we are doing at the moment if it is not producing what
we
need. In
particular, we need to be able to announce a new initiative on the
police
within the
next month.” He added that it was important to “get something done
…
527