The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
388.
Maj Gen Stewart
explained that 50 percent of his force was assisting with
SSR
during that
time. He said that SSR continued in April (although it reduced to
25 percent
of his
force’s time) but that “one or two of the major incidents we had
was people …
actually
moving from location to location to try and help the
SSR”.
389.
Hard
Lessons summarised ISF
performance during the violence of April 2004:
“Many
elements of the newly deployed Iraqi Security Forces proved
unwilling or
unable to
fight. Some abandoned their posts and aided the insurgency.
Others
mutinied
when they came under fire. Iraqi police units collapsed in
Fallujah, Najaf,
Karbala,
and Kut, and the number of Iraqi police dropped by nearly 3,000 in
one
week in
April 2004. The Iraq Civil Defense Corps fared worst of all. From
April 2 to
April 16,
up to 12,000 ICDC members deserted; the rates reached up to 30
percent
in
northeastern Iraq, 49 percent in Baghdad, 30 percent in the
South‑Central region,
and 82
percent in Western Iraq.”336
390.
A summary
produced for No.10 by the Cabinet Office in late April stated that
the
Iraqi
police were fully recruited against a target of 75,000 but that
ICDC numbers, having
risen to
35,000 in early April, had subsequently fallen to
25,000.337
391.
On 13 April,
Mr Richmond reported that:
“The
weaknesses in the new Iraqi Security Forces have been exposed by
the events
of the last
week. Bremer and Sanchez are keen on the [Iraqi] Defence
Minister’s
idea of
establishing a 10,000 man task force which would draw on some of
the
‘non‑tainted’
elements of the former regime’s special forces, the newly
trained
counter
terrorism company and Iraqi Army and ICDC battalions. They also
want to
bring
former military officers back into the security structures to
create an Iraqi chain
392.
Mr Blair
met President Bush on 16 April.339
At the meeting
Mr Blair stated that
he was
concerned by progress on recruiting, equipping and training the
ICDC and
the police.
393.
In April 2004,
Dominic Asquith, FCO Director Iraq, reported that
consideration
was being
given to re‑engaging dismissed military officers.340
336
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
337
Minute Dodd
to Quarrey, 30 April 2004, ‘Iraqi Security Force
Capabilities’.
338
Telegram
153 IraqRep to FCO London, 13 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Four day Easter
Roundup’.
339
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Bush’.
340
Telegram
181 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Politics’.
142