7 | Conclusions: Pre-conflict strategy and planning

28. In an Assessment on 1 November, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) judged

that Saddam Hussein felt “little pressure to negotiate over … resolution 1284 because

the proceeds of oil smuggling and illicit trade have increased significantly this year, and

more countries are increasing diplomatic contacts and trade with Iraq”.5

29. The JIC also judged:

“Saddam would only contemplate co-operation with [resolution] 1284, and the

return of inspectors … if it could be portrayed as a victory. He will not agree to

co‑operate unless:

• there is a UN-agreed timetable for the lifting of sanctions. Saddam

suspects that the US would not agree to sanctions lift while he remained

in power;

• he is able to negotiate with the UN in advance to weaken the inspection

provisions. His ambitions to rebuild Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction

programmes makes him hostile to intrusive inspections or any other

constraints likely to be effective.

“Before accepting 1284, Saddam will try to obtain the abolition of the No-Fly Zones.

He is also likely to demand that the US should abandon its stated aim to topple the

Iraqi regime.”

30. In November 2000, Mr Blair’s “preferred option” was described as the

implementation of 1284, enabling inspectors to return and sanctions to be suspended.6

31. In December 2000, the British Embassy Washington reported growing pressure

to change course from containment to military action to oust Saddam Hussein,

but no decision to change policy or to begin military planning had been taken by

President Clinton.7

32. The Key Judgements of a JIC Assessment in February 2001 included:

• There was “broad international consensus to maintain the arms embargo

at least as long as Saddam remains in power. Saddam faces no economic

pressure to accept … [resolution] 1284 because he is successfully

undermining the economic sanctions regime.”

• “Through abuse of the UN Oil-for-Food [OFF] programme and smuggling of

oil and other goods” it was estimated that Saddam Hussein would “be able to

appropriate in the region of $1.5bn to $1.8bn in cash and goods in 2001”,

and there was “scope for earning even more”.

5 JIC Assessment, 1 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co-operation with UNSCR 1284’.

6 Letter Sawers to Cowper-Coles, 27 November 2000, ‘Iraq’.

7 Letter Barrow to Sawers, 15 December 2000, ‘Iraq’.

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