The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The
development of the Iraqi Army was considerably more successful
than
that of the
Iraqi Police Service. But the UK was still aware before it
withdrew
from Iraq
that the Iraqi Army had not been sufficiently tested. The UK was
not
confident
that the Iraqi Army could maintain security without
support.
820.
The following
key findings are from Section 13.2, and relate to evidence
in
Section 13.1:
•
The direct
cost of the conflict in Iraq was at least £9.2bn (the equivalent
of
£11.83bn in
2016). In total, 89 percent of that was spent on military
operations.
•
The
Government’s decision to take part in military action against Iraq
was not
affected by
consideration of the potential financial cost to the UK of the
invasion
or the
post‑conflict period.
•
Ministers
were not provided with estimates of military conflict and
post‑conflict
costs, or
with advice on their affordability, when decisions were taken on
the
scale of
the UK’s military contribution to a US‑led invasion of Iraq, and on
the
UK’s role
in the post‑conflict period. They should have been.
•
There was
no articulated need for additional financial resources for
military
operations
in Iraq that was not met.
•
The
arrangements for funding military Urgent Operational Requirements
and
other
military costs worked as intended, and did not constrain the UK
military’s
ability to
conduct operations in Iraq.
•
The
controls imposed by the Treasury on the MOD’s budget in September
2003
did not
constrain the UK military’s ability to conduct operations in
Iraq.
•
The
Government was slow to recognise that Iraq was an enduring
operation,
and to
adapt its funding arrangements to support both military operations
and
civilian
activities.
•
The
arrangements for securing funding for civilian activities could be
slow
and unpredictable.
Some high‑priority civilian activities were funded late
or
only in
part.
821.
The following
key findings are from Section 14.2, and relate to evidence
in
Section 14.1:
•
Between
2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key
capability
areas,
including protected mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition
and
Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and helicopter support.
•
It was not
sufficiently clear which person or department within the MOD
had
responsibility
for identifying and articulating capability gaps.
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