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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
The development of the Iraqi Army was considerably more successful than
that of the Iraqi Police Service. But the UK was still aware before it withdrew
from Iraq that the Iraqi Army had not been sufficiently tested. The UK was not
confident that the Iraqi Army could maintain security without support.
Resources
820.  The following key findings are from Section 13.2, and relate to evidence in
Section 13.1:
The direct cost of the conflict in Iraq was at least £9.2bn (the equivalent of
£11.83bn in 2016). In total, 89 percent of that was spent on military operations.
The Government’s decision to take part in military action against Iraq was not
affected by consideration of the potential financial cost to the UK of the invasion
or the post‑conflict period.
Ministers were not provided with estimates of military conflict and post‑conflict
costs, or with advice on their affordability, when decisions were taken on the
scale of the UK’s military contribution to a US‑led invasion of Iraq, and on the
UK’s role in the post‑conflict period. They should have been.
There was no articulated need for additional financial resources for military
operations in Iraq that was not met.
The arrangements for funding military Urgent Operational Requirements and
other military costs worked as intended, and did not constrain the UK military’s
ability to conduct operations in Iraq.
The controls imposed by the Treasury on the MOD’s budget in September 2003
did not constrain the UK military’s ability to conduct operations in Iraq.
The Government was slow to recognise that Iraq was an enduring operation,
and to adapt its funding arrangements to support both military operations and
civilian activities.
The arrangements for securing funding for civilian activities could be slow
and unpredictable. Some high‑priority civilian activities were funded late or
only in part.
Military equipment (post‑conflict)
821.  The following key findings are from Section 14.2, and relate to evidence in
Section 14.1:
Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability
areas, including protected mobility, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and helicopter support.
It was not sufficiently clear which person or department within the MOD had
responsibility for identifying and articulating capability gaps.
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