The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
229.
At the meeting
of the ISG on the same day, Mr Martin Dinham, DFID
Director
Europe,
Middle East and Americas, set out what DFID would do “in response
to
the renewed
Ministerial mandate to press ahead with reconstruction,
particularly in
MND(SE)”.136
The £40m
Iraq Infrastructure Services Programme (IISP) would be
approved in
the next few weeks. More money was available for job creation if
required.
But it was
also key to get other donors engaged. Mr Benn and DFID
officials were
lobbying
the UN, World Bank and IMF. Officials in Basra were conducting a
review of
infrastructure
requirements to identify gaps.
230.
Mr Blair
wrote to Mr Wolfensohn on 16 February, highlighting the slow
pace of
delivery on
Trust Fund projects and the value of having core World Bank staff
(rather
than a
contracted liaison officer) in Iraq, and offering to provide
accommodation and
security
for World Bank staff in Baghdad and Basra.137
231.
Mr Benn
wrote to Mr Wolfensohn the following day:
“We need to
seek innovative ways of managing the difficulties and risks
associated
with
working in present-day Iraq. The [World] Bank might need to
reallocate funding
to new
projects that can be delivered … One way to do this might be to
channel
funding
directly through provincial government systems to their priority
projects.” 138
232.
Mr Benn
repeated Mr Blair’s offer to provide support for World Bank
staff in Iraq,
and
highlighted the need for a strong World Bank presence in the power
sector.
233.
Mr Dinham
followed up those proposals in meetings with World Bank
officials
during a
visit to New York and Washington from 21 to 24
February.139
234.
During the
meetings, World Bank officials argued that:
•
Bank
officials could achieve a lot from the Bank’s office in Amman,
Jordan;
•
there were
presentational difficulties in being too closely associated with
one
particular
Member State; and
•
operating
in Iraq was expensive and difficult.
235.
Mr Dinham
rejected those arguments, pointing out that the UN was
now
establishing
a presence in Iraq with two permanent development specialists and a
large
number of
staff supporting the election process.
236.
Mr Dinham
also pressed the Bank to accelerate disbursement from its Trust
Fund.
The UN was
now performing better than the Bank. Mr Dinham suggested that
the Bank
136
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 11 February 2005,
‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.
137
Letter
Blair to Wolfensohn, 16 February 2005, [untitled].
138
Letter Benn
to Wolfensohn, 17 February 2005, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction’.
139
Minute
Dinham to Shafik, 28 February 2005, ‘Visit to Washington and New
York, 21-24 February 2005:
Discussion
of Iraq Issues’.
234