The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
including
an attack on the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad’s Green Zone, was
sufficient to
convince
some that a pivotal point in the security situation had been
reached.
71.
When President
Bush visited London in November, Mr Blair provided him with
a
paper
written by Sir Jeremy Greenstock which argued that security should
be the highest
priority in
the run-up to June 2004, when the Iraqi Transitional Government
would take
power. Sir
Jeremy suggested that troop levels should be looked at again and
highlighted
“the
dangers we face if we do not get a grip on the security situation”
as a topic that
President
Bush and Mr Blair needed to discuss in stark
terms.
72.
The
constraints within which the UK was operating as a result of the
limited scale
of forces
deployed in Iraq were articulated clearly for the Chiefs of Staff
in December.
Lt Gen
Fry argued that a strategy of “early effect”17
was needed
which prioritised
campaign
success. Operation TELIC was the UK “Main Effort”, but deploying
additional
resources
in a way that was compliant with the Defence Planning Assumptions
would
require the
withdrawal of resources from other operations.
73.
On 1 January
2004, Sir Jeremy Greenstock wrote bluntly: “This theatre
remains
74.
Despite
mounting evidence of violent insurgency, the UK’s policy of
military
drawdown in
Iraq continued. After force levels had been reviewed in January,
the
rationale
for continued drawdown was based on adjusted criteria by which the
success
of Security
Sector Reform would be judged, meaning that such reform would
be
implemented
“only to applicable standards for Iraq”.19
The UK’s
approach to the development of new political structures for Iraq
assumed the
need for an
Iraqi Government that was as inclusive and representative as
possible.
A more
representative government was bound to reflect the views of the
Shia majority
more
closely. This created a risk of reprisals against members of the
minority Sunni
community,
of which Saddam Hussein was a member, after many years in which
they had
dominated Iraq.
The UK
sought to minimise the opportunities for reprisals and to ensure
balance,
supported
by the JIC’s assessment that “disaffected Sunni Arabs – not
necessarily
connected
to the former regime – who fear Shia domination and are frustrated
by lack of
money and
jobs”20
were a
potential source of resistance to the Coalition.
17
Minute
DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 5 December 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Review of UK
Military Strategy for Iraq’.
18
Telegram
337 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Six Final Months
of Occupation’.
19
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 29 January 2004, ‘Op TELIC Force Level Review –
Jan 04’.
20
JIC
Assessment, 31 March 2004, ‘Iraq Security: Prospects’.
482