9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

653. The Defence Committee considered that there had been significant progress in the

training, equipping and mentoring of the Iraqi Army in the past year but:

“There remain murderous, corrupt and militia-infiltrated elements within the Police

which must be rooted out as a matter of priority. The UK continues to play an

important role in training and mentoring the Iraqi Army and Police. It is unclear how

its trainers will be supported once UK forces levels are reduced further in the spring.”

654. In relation to plans to reduce UK forces levels to 2,500 in spring 2008, the

Committee wrote:

“Important questions remain about the sustainability of a force of this size. If there is

still a role for UK Forces in Iraq, those Forces must be capable of doing more than

just protecting themselves at Basra Air Station. If the reduction in numbers means

they cannot do more than this, the entire UK presence in South-Eastern Iraq will be

open to question.”

655. In a Current Assessment Note issued on 4 December, a CIG considered the

significance to JAM and the Sadrists of the Iraqi National Gathering (ING) splinter

group.300

656. The CIG assessed that those close to Muqtada al-Sadr were concerned that

the ING’s establishment might lead to a significant number of defections from the

mainstream Sadrist movement, but judged that those who might consider defecting were

likely to wait to see the impact of the ING before joining the new movement.

657. The note continued:

“Sadr probably views the ING as a direct attack on his authority. He does not appear

willing to make any concessions …

“As former JAM special group commanders, the ING members have links to the

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and Lebanese Hizballah. However,

we have no intelligence to suggest that either is supporting the ING.”

658. On 4 December, a video was released of one of the five British hostages

kidnapped from the Ministry of Finance in Baghdad on 29 May by men dressed in Iraqi

Police uniforms.301 In it, the kidnappers threatened to kill a hostage if the UK did not

leave Iraq by 13 December.

659. Prime Minister Maliki and Governor Waili met on 5 December and “cleared the

air between them”, paving the way for PIC. Prime Minister Maliki communicated his

immediate priorities for Basra, including reconciliation encompassing all political parties

and measures to curb corruption.

300 CIG Current Assessment Note, 4 December 2007, ‘Iraq: How Important is the Iraqi National Gathering?’

301 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Brown, [undated], ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Basra: 9 December

2007’.

303