13.1 |
Resources
340.
The official
recommended two options, depending on “political and
presentational
requirements”:
•
agree the
claim subject to further detail on how and when the money would
be
spent;
or
•
provide
£55m to cover immediate needs. That figure comprised the
amounts
requested
for NGOs and for DFID’s bilateral effort (both of which would
be
“politically
difficult” to resist), and £20m for the UN Flash
Appeal.
341.
Mr Bowman
advised the Treasury official on 26 March that Mr Brown’s view
was
that the
Treasury should agree to provide £100m to DFID. He asked the
official for a
revised
draft reply for Mr Boateng to send to Ms Short justifying
that as a reasonable
342.
Later that
day, Mr Bowman advised the Treasury official that
Mr Brown had, after
further
reflection, decided to provide the full amount requested by
Ms Short (£120m).201
343.
Mr Boateng
replied to Ms Short on 27 March, agreeing her bid in full,
subject to
further
detail on how and when the money would be spent.202
344.
By 27 March,
the UK Government had earmarked £240m for humanitarian
relief:
•
£30m for
the UK military to provide humanitarian relief in the UK’s AO, from
the
Reserve;
•
£90m from
DFID’s own resources; and
•
£120m for
DFID from the Reserve.
345.
The Inquiry
asked Ms Short and Sir Suma Chakrabarti whether DFID had
had
the resources
to deliver, with the MOD, an exemplary humanitarian effort in the
South.
346.
Ms Short
told the Inquiry:
“… I had
written a number of letters saying, ‘All we [DFID] have got is
our
Contingency
Reserve and I’m supposed to keep that for other emergencies in
the
world … if
we mean this [the exemplary approach in the South], there has got
to
be some
money on the table’, and what we were getting from the Treasury was
no
answer,
nothing and it was this period of stand‑off. Gordon Brown was
pushed out
and
marginalised at the time …
“So after a
lot of delay and a number of efforts, the Treasury … came with a
letter
saying,
‘There is no money. Money is very tight, and, therefore, we have
got to have
a UN
Resolution so we can get the World Bank and the IMF and all the
others in’.
200
Email
Bowman to Treasury [junior official], 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq
Humanitarian Funding: DFID Reserve
claim’.
201
Email
Bowman to Treasury [junior official], 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq
Humanitarian Funding: DFID Reserve
claim’.
202
Letter
Boateng to Short, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Funding:
Reserve Claim’.
499