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4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
it did not address the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities
and intentions or the actual threat posed by Iraq’s WMD at that stage.2
11.  Sir Richard Dearlove discussed policy towards Iraq in a meeting with
Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, in Washington
on 19 July.3
12.  The report of that discussion stated that the US view was:
There was “growing evidence of the construction of CBW production and links
to terrorists [in Iraq] stoking fears of a repeat 9/11 with WMD”.
There was a strong strategic case for removing Saddam Hussein. Continued
development of WMD was not in doubt.
A casus belli already existed.
13.  Sir Richard reported that he was told a US “decision [on action] had already been
taken – the question was only how and when”.
14.  Sir Richard also reported that, in a separate discussion with a senior US official,
he had been told that the US Administration’s intention was to set the threshold on UN
weapons inspections so high that Iraq would not be able to hold up US policy.
15.  Sir David Manning drew Mr Blair’s attention to the report, commenting:
“Not much doubt here that the Administration is bent on action soon, and convincing
itself that it has strong strategic, as well as a historical duty to act.
“Our views on links between Iraq, terrorism and development of WMD are different
from Condi’s: not proven at best …
“C [Sir Richard Dearlove] will be able to give the full picture tomorrow.”4
16.  Mr Powell commented: “Strengthens the need for and urgency of your note
to Bush.”5
17.  Sir David Manning gave Mr Blair an Annotated Agenda for the meeting on 23 July,
including inviting:
Mr Scarlett to set the scene with a “very brief summary” of the intelligence
on the position inside Iraq; and
Sir Richard Dearlove to provide a brief account of his recent talks in Washington.
He had returned “convinced that the Administration have moved up a gear”.6
2  Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.
3  Report, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq [C’s account of discussions with Dr Rice]’.
4  Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
5  Manuscript comment Powell to Prime Minister on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
6  Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq Meeting: 23 July: Annotated Agenda’.
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