4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
it did
not address the issue of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities
and
intentions or the actual threat posed by Iraq’s WMD at that
stage.2
11.
Sir Richard
Dearlove discussed policy towards Iraq in a meeting
with
Dr Condoleezza
Rice, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, in
Washington
12.
The report of
that discussion stated that the US view was:
•
There was
“growing evidence of the construction of CBW production and
links
to terrorists
[in Iraq] stoking fears of a repeat 9/11 with WMD”.
•
There was a
strong strategic case for removing Saddam Hussein.
Continued
development
of WMD was not in doubt.
•
A casus
belli already existed.
13.
Sir Richard
reported that he was told a US “decision [on action] had already
been
taken – the
question was only how and when”.
14.
Sir Richard
also reported that, in a separate discussion with a senior US
official,
he had been
told that the US Administration’s intention was to set the
threshold on UN
weapons
inspections so high that Iraq would not be able to hold up US
policy.
15.
Sir David
Manning drew Mr Blair’s attention to the report,
commenting:
“Not much
doubt here that the Administration is bent on action soon, and
convincing
itself that
it has strong strategic, as well as a historical duty to
act.
“Our views
on links between Iraq, terrorism and development of WMD are
different
from
Condi’s: not proven at best …
…
“C [Sir
Richard Dearlove] will be able to give the full picture
tomorrow.”4
16.
Mr Powell
commented: “Strengthens the need for and urgency of your
note
17.
Sir David
Manning gave Mr Blair an Annotated Agenda for the meeting on
23 July,
including
inviting:
•
Mr Scarlett
to set the scene with a “very brief summary” of the
intelligence
on the position
inside Iraq; and
•
Sir Richard
Dearlove to provide a brief account of his recent talks in
Washington.
He had
returned “convinced that the Administration have moved up a
gear”.6
2
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
3
Report, 22
July 2002, ‘Iraq [C’s account of discussions with Dr
Rice]’.
4
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
5
Manuscript
comment Powell to Prime Minister on Minute Manning to Prime
Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
6
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraq Meeting: 23 July:
Annotated Agenda’.
117