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6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)
161.  Mr Watkins replied on 31 July, explaining that Mr Hoon had decided “it would be
premature to widen the net of knowledge”; and that:
“… no costs should be incurred on UORs and sustainability enhancements for the
purposes of a campaign in Iraq … No estimates should be submitted to Treasury
Officials.”70
162.  Mr Bowen wrote to Mr Watkins on 1 August, acknowledging Mr Hoon’s clear
directions but pressing “urgently” to take forward work on antitoxin71 by widening the
MOD planning circle.72 Antitoxin was identified as an “essential” element in all three
packages under consideration, “about whose potential availability we do not know nearly
enough at present”. Mr Bowen wrote:
“In the event of any deployment, the proper preparations to enable British Forces
to deal with the possible biological and chemical release would be essential … It
seems likely that decisions on the acquisition of antitoxin, when they come to be
made, will be on the critical path for the deployment of a war fighting capability.”
163.  Mr Bowen recommended “strongly” that Mr Hoon should agree that “on a very
limited, need-to-know basis further staffing should be conducted with the inclusion of
nominated NBC and Porton Down73 staff”.
164.  Mr Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, responded on 7 August that,
“exceptionally”, staffing could be widened “on a strict need to know basis”, including
NBC and Porton Down staff as requested.74
DETAILED PLANNING FOR UORS BEGINS
165.  The MOD had defined essential equipment needed “now” for potential
operations in Iraq as “showstoppers”. That became the benchmark for
determining whether the unavailability of an item should halt the deployment
of UK forces.
166.  On 9 August, Lt Gen Pigott published lists of individuals within the MOD (the
“Centurion” group) and PJHQ (the “Warrior” group) who were authorised to receive
“the most sensitive material relating to US planning and UK scoping on Iraq” during the
summer.75 That is described in Section 6.1.
70  Minute PS/SofS [MOD] to Sec(O)1a, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements Required For Potential
UK Contribution’.
71 An antibody with the ability to neutralise a particular toxin; used as a countermeasure in the event
of chemical or biological attack.
72  Minute DG Op Pol to PS/SofS [MOD], 1 August 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements Required For Possible
UK Contribution’.
73  The headquarters for the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL).
74  Minute PS/Min(AF) to DG Op Pol, 7 August 2002, ‘Iraq – Enhancements For Possible UK
Contribution – Antitoxin’.
75  Minute MA2/DCDS(C), 9 August 2002, ‘Centurion Group’.
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