3.4  |  Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September 2002

• “Most regional governments would be happy to see Saddam’s demise. But

they would be likely to have profound misgivings about a campaign without a

well‑constructed plan for a new Iraq. All agree that Iraq’s territorial integrity must

be maintained. But there are differing regional concerns about the place of the

Kurds and Shia in any new regime, the type of government and its relationship

with the West. Arab States want Iraq to remain a counter‑balance to Iran.”

• There were “economic concerns about the effect of lost trade”.

67.  In addition, the Assessment included the following points:

• The “volatility in Israel/Palestine” continued to “dominate the Arab World’s

attention. The pro‑Western Arab States may accept a military build up in the

region, even in the absence of more concrete progress on Palestine. But we

assess that in the run up to an Iraq campaign, Arab governments’ support

could be withdrawn with any worsening of the Israel/Palestine security

situation.”

• “As the originator of the Arab peace initiative, Crown Prince Abdullah [of Saudi

Arabia]” remained “focused on Palestine”. If there was “little progress there” or

the US was “perceived as resistant to Saudi pressure” that would be “damaging

to his domestic credibility”. Anti‑US sentiment remained “strong” and the JIC

judged that “for the next few months at least”, there was “no prospect of Saudi

Arabia agreeing to provide basing for US military action … even if the prospects

for the return of inspectors” remained “slim”.

• Iran feared “eventually being targeted by the US” and was “seriously alarmed

at the prospect of greater encirclement by the US if a pro‑Western regime were

installed in Baghdad”. Once a US attack began, the JIC assessed that Iran

“would probably boost its support for Shia groups working against Saddam, with

the aim of increasing its own influence in Iraq”. The JIC judged that the Iranian

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “would be likely to work directly to

undermine US influence, e.g. by manipulating Iraqi groups through propaganda

and the selective provision of money and arms, although it would not undertake

anything that would provoke US military retaliation”.

• “In the build up to an attack … Saddam would seek to speak direct to the ‘Arab

street to incite unrest … Saddam may also begin a campaign of terrorism

and sabotage, possibly even before an attack began. Iraq has consistently

failed in previous attempts to conduct successful attacks, either through its own

agents or by proxy … But there is a risk that once Saddam was convinced a

regime threatening attack was inevitable he could become more willing to adopt

extreme, unpredictable and unorthodox courses of action.”

68.  The implication of the Assessment was that the US “must continue to convince

regional governments of its determination and ability to remove Saddam quickly and

offer credible plans for the aftermath”.

105