4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
The missile
designs described were “different to some of those
previously
highlighted
in intelligence, because they are claimed to be based on
Volga
engine
technology rather than SCUD”.
Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
•
The former
Director of the Centre responsible for the UAV programme
had
confirmed
that an Iraqi UAV flew 500km in June 2002. He continued to state
that
they were
not designed for the delivery of chemical or biological
agent.
Proliferation
•
“We remain
concerned about the proliferation of material, equipment
and
technical
knowledge from Iraq to third parties … We have not been able
to
substantiate
intelligence and media reporting of missiles and other
related
material
being sent to Syria or other countries.”
385.
Addressing why
there had been no finds of chemical and biological munitions
or
stocks of
agent, or Al Hussein missiles or parts, the Assessment
stated:
“A number
of high value detainees claim that these munitions and systems do
not
exist.
However, there are serious doubts are [sic] their openness and
co-operation.
The weight
of intelligence prior to the conflict, and the fact that the
investigative
process is
at a very early stage, lead us to maintain our previous
judgements.
“A number
of other explanations have been proposed about the fate of Iraq’s
WMD
munitions
and systems, some of which are supported by
intelligence:
•
munitions
were deployed but have not yet been found, because they
were
either
destroyed or hidden on the battlefield;
•
they were
destroyed to ensure they were not discovered by
UNMOVIC
inspections
– […] This would be more extreme than the concealment
measures
considered by the JIC in its paper of 11 October 2002
on
inspections.
There has also been a suggestion that some munitions
were
destroyed
just prior to the conflict but intelligence on this has yet to
be
verified;
•
Iraq’s
concealment operation was so comprehensive that it did not allow
for
rapid
reconstitution of an effective CBW or Al Hussein missile
capability –
[…] The gap
between UN weapons inspectors leaving and the start of
the
conflict
was only three days.
•
the
political decision-making process in Iraq was paralysed by
the
Coalition attack
…”
497