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4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
125.  The FCO response was sent to No.10 on 2 September by Mr Mark Sedwill, one
of Mr Straw’s Private Secretaries who had been attached to UNSCOM between 1996
and 1998.56
126.  Addressing the question “Does Iraq possess WMD?”, the FCO stated:
“Yes. Iraq is still hiding weapons of mass destruction in a range of locations. The
regime has admitted hiding chemical, biological weapons and missile parts …
“The Iraqi regime has admitted producing large quantities of chemical warfare
agents … It has also admitted … producing biological warfare agents …
“In the course of their work between 1991 and 1998, UN weapons inspectors
were unable to account for thousands of tonnes of so-called precursor chemicals
used in the production of weapons; hundreds of tonnes of chemicals used in the
production of VX nerve agent; up to a dozen ballistic missiles with a range of over
600 kilometres; and tens of thousands of special munitions which can be used in
chemical and biological weapons.”
127.  Addressing “Developments in Iraq’s WMD programmes Since the Last
Inspections?”, the FCO stated:
“… the Baghdad regime continues to pursue ballistic missile, nuclear, chemical
and biological programmes in breach of its UN obligations.
“We believe that Iraq has recently accelerated its weapons programmes.
For example:
“Saddam’s ballistic missile programme has made continued progress and facilities
damaged by Operation Desert Fox in 1998 have been repaired. We believe that
he is planning to extend the range of his current missiles beyond the 150km limit
imposed by the UN …
“We have reports of increased nuclear procurement. We think R&D on a nuclear
weapons programme has restarted. If sanctions are lifted, we believe that Saddam
could develop a nuclear weapon within 5 years. If he were able to procure fissile
material from outside Iraq, then he might possess a nuclear capability in a much
shorter timeframe.
“We believe that the Iraqi regime continues its biological and chemical weapons
programmes.”
128.  The FCO advised Mr Blair that Iraq did not have an active civil nuclear programme
and that almost all its facilities had been dismantled after 1991. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspected “the small quantity of radioactive material which
Iraq was permitted to keep for research”. The FCO added: “In these circumstances,
56  Letter Sedwill to Rycroft, 2 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
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