The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses:
•
UK analysis
of and attempted response to the deterioriating security
situation,
including
the development of a sectarian insurgency and the emergence
of
Al Qaida
and of the Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in the South;
•
consideration
of the deployment of UK military assets and HQ ARRC;
•
the UK’s
role in the political development of Iraq under the Coalition
Provisional
Authority,
including appointment of the Governing Council, the
Transitional
Administrative
Law and 15 November Agreement and handover to the
Iraqi
Interim
Government; and
•
the impact
of the first US offensive in Fallujah and the revelations of abuse
by
US soliders
in Abu Ghraib.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the
exclusion of Ba’athists from positions of power in Iraq, which is
described in
Section 11;
or
•
the UK
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and reform of its
security sector,
which are
covered in Sections 10 and 12.
3.
The Inquiry’s
conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can
be
read in
Section 9.8.
4.
On 23 May
2003, Ambassador L Paul Bremer, Head of the Coalition
Provisional
Authority
(CPA), issued CPA Order No.2.1
5.
The Order
dissolved Saddam Hussein’s military and security structures,
including
the
Ministries responsible for Defence, Information and Military
Affairs; the intelligence
agencies;
the armed forces; and paramilitary forces. It also announced that
the CPA
planned to
create a new Iraqi Army, which is described in Section
12.1.
6.
Following a
visit by Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser,
to Iraq (see
Section
9.1) the Chiefs of Staff had been asked to consider whether the UK
should move
16 Air
Assault Brigade to Baghdad (16 AA Bde) with the task of providing
police training
for six
weeks.
1
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order No.2, 23 May 2003.
208