The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
UK
liability. The second two options carried an inherent “acceptance
of probable long
term
campaign failure”, which could destabilise the Middle East, create
a safe haven for
international
terrorists and damage the reputation and morale of the UK defence
forces.
416.
Lt Gen Fry did
not recommend a particular course of action but
concluded:
“The
situation in Iraq is grave and demands hard strategic choices for
the UK, none
of which
are palatable and all of which carry far-reaching consequences. But
we
must not
shirk a decision – more of the same will simply make the UK a
spectator
to failure.
The purist military response would be to increase scales of effort,
but
the
political will to do so will be minimal. Even then, an increased UK
military effort
alone may
not deliver success. The opportunity for the UK, or even the MNF-I,
to
decisively
influence the campaign may be gone. If we believe this to be the
case, we
should seek
a strategy of limited liability. But this will be very difficult to
actually bring
off and
accepts the inevitability of campaign failure in Iraq with
far-reaching, long
term,
damaging consequences.”
417.
Lt Gen Fry
told the AHMGIR on 13 January that as expected there had been
an
increase in
violence, focused on the ISF and those connected with
preparing
418.
Mr Straw
stated that the insurgents were “systematically targeting the
democratic
process in
an effort to make it hard to claim the elections could be free and
fair”.
This should
be countered by “making clear the degree of public interest in
elections
in Iraq and
the progress that had been made in preparing for
them”.
419.
Ministers
noted the “continuing need” to encourage Sunni participation and
to
ensure the
broadest possible participation in the constitutional drafting
process after
the elections.
420.
Mr Chaplin was
also considering the future UK military role, and sent a message
to
the FCO in
London that, whoever won the election, they were likely to “want
something
more
definite about the MNF’s future” than the simple fact of resolution
1546, and might
invoke the
review clause in the resolution at any time.221
421.
In a press
conference on 14 January, Mr Annan said:
“It is
clear that the vast majority of Iraqis are eager to exercise their
democratic right
to vote.
But it is equally obvious that the conditions in which the election
is being
held are
far from ideal.
…
220
Minutes, 13
January 2005, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
221
Telegram 31
Baghdad to FCO London, 13 January 2005, ‘Iraq: MIPT: MNF
Mandate’.
462