3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
course
recognise that allied support would be much easier to achieve if
they could
get
Security Council endorsement for military action. They are already
playing
the
inspections issue in the Council with a view to putting Saddam
clearly in the
wrong. But
they claim they … have sufficient legal justification for military
action
in Saddam’s
breach of earlier UNSC [UN Security Council] resolutions. It is
highly
unlikely
that they would go to the Council for further endorsement unless
they were
100 percent
sure they would get it. A number of Administration hawks … have
made
it clear
that in their view the case for regime change would not be affected
if Saddam
accepted
inspectors, on whatever terms.”
84.
Mr Brenton
wrote that President Bush had “recently tried to calm the press
frenzy
by talking
about a ‘patient and deliberate’ approach”. American domestic and
political
opinion
would be more important to the US Administration than the UN. So
far the
public
debate had run “rather against the Administration” with a number of
Republican
heavyweights,
including General Scowcroft, “lining up to question the wisdom of
military
action”.
Opinion polls showed strong support for action. Congressional
hearings would
resume on
16 September and Mr Brenton reported that there were
indications that
Administration
testimony would “start to make the case for military
action”.
85.
Mr Brenton
described what to do on the “day after” as the “most vexed”
issue.
A senior
State Department official had said that they were “increasingly
thinking in
terms of
some form of democracy, but recognised that it would need to be
propped
up by a
long term international, (i.e. almost certainly US) security
presence”. In a
recent
conference the Iraqi opposition had made it clear there should not
be a “foreign
invasion”;
they wanted to be in charge.
86.
Mr Brenton
concluded:
“Finally,
as the key operational issues come to be addressed (including
whether
to go ahead
at all), there is the balance of power within the Administration.
The
arch hawks
are Rumsfeld and Cheney both of whom firmly support military
action
and are
undeterred by the possible effect on the already inflammable Middle
East
(indeed
they believe the successful US action in Iraq would have a salutary
effect on
other
troublesome entities in the region). The instincts of the President
himself (and
therefore
Rice [Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security
Advisor])
are likely
to be closer to their side than to that of Powell, who is plausibly
reported
to be more
cautiously [sic]. There is also the political dimension. The
Administration
will not
want to get into a vote losing quagmire – but will also be wary of
failing to
meet the
strong expectations they have now created. The key point about this
not
unfamiliar
pattern … is that (eg as on the MEPP) it is normally the
Rumsfeld/Cheney
faction
that prevails.”
87.
Mr Brenton’s
letter was seen by Mr Blair before a telephone call with
Mr Straw on
19 August
in preparation for the latter’s meeting with Secretary
Powell.33
33
Manuscript
comment Wechsberg, 19 August 2002, on Letter Brenton to Private
Secretary [FCO],
15 August
2002, ‘Iraq’.
109