The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Sir Jeremy
thought an “intensive capability” on the ground would be “an
enormous
asset” and
that the US should be persuaded it was “worth paying a price
for”.
•
“… perhaps
most crucially, convincing the US that we will not support
heavy
military
action against Iraq in the current circumstances. If the Americans
do
not buy
into the strategy outlined above, then together we will have to
think of
another
one. We cannot do nothing and allow war against Iraq to become
the
only option
by default.”90
161.
The objectives
should be:
•
a “unified
P5 approach to tackle Iraqi WMD, perhaps involving a negotiation
to
clarify but
not renegotiate 1284”;
•
clear
limits “to avoid the Russians demanding endless concessions to
secure
Iraqi
cooperation”; and
•
“reinvigorated
action to tackle illegal Iraqi revenue”.
162.
Sir Jeremy
wrote that he “remained surprised at the lack of US and UK activity
to
take on the
Syrians over their pipeline”.
163.
Sir Jeremy
concluded:
“Much of
this deals with the US angle … The most immediate need is to have
a
dedicated
discussion with them at a senior level in sufficient detail to
thrash out
the answers
on the complex questions involved.”
164.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that:
“As the
US-led Coalition in Afghanistan began to deal effectively with the
problems
there, and
as the US machine gathered itself to create firmer defences against
any
possible
further terrorist attacks, we began to see that there was not much
energy
being
expended in Washington on outreach, consultation and good
relationships.
Even before
I heard of any serious action being taken to prepare for a
possible
attack on
Iraq, I was coming to the conclusion that the United States was
missing
165.
FCO junior
officials prepared a draft paper, ‘Iraq: Fallback option’ for a
meeting
on Iraq
to be chaired by the Cabinet Office on 30 October, setting out the
background
to the
differing positions of Iraq and of the P5 members of the Security
Council.92
Those included:
•
Iraq’s
claims that resolution 1284 (1999) was so ambiguous that the US
could
easily deny
that co-operation had been adequate to trigger suspension
of
sanctions;
90
Letter
Greenstock to Manning, 29 October 2001, ‘Iraq: Cabinet Office
Meeting, 30 October’.
91
Statement,
November 2009, page 5.
92
Email
Tanfield to Saunders, 30 October 2001, ‘Iraq: Fallback
Option’.
342