10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
UK’s
priorities over the next six months were to keep the CPA focused on
job creation
schemes and
to build capacity in Iraqi ministries and institutions. The
Treasury and DFID
were
providing support on budget execution and financial
management.
897.
The paper
concluded that the UK’s work in all areas “must be supported
by
continued
progress on reconstruction”. DFID were producing a paper on the
links
between the
political process and reconstruction over the next
year.
898.
Mr Blair
annotated the paper: “This is excellent and seems the right
strategy”.518
899.
Also on 22
January, Sir Hilary offered proposals from Basra on a “post-30
June
strategy”
to maintain the benefits and momentum of CPA(South)’s
work.519
In his
view,
the
priority was to manage CPA(South)’s US$212m programme of work to
completion (it
had never
been intended to complete by 30 June), using broadly the same
management
structures
and (predominately British) personnel. The US would need to be
persuaded to
continue to
provide accommodation and security, and to agree to a single
international
“Co-ordinator”
for the South, “ideally but not essentially British”. The UK would
need to
continue to
provide broadly the same level of staffing in the
South.
900.
A bilateral UK
programme should complement rather than “diminish”
that
priority
effort.
901.
An early
decision on how the UK intended to work in the South after
transition
would
enable the UK to influence US planning. Sir Hilary warned that the
US might be
planning to
take over CPA(South)’s existing programme of the work. The US would
be
unlikely to
be able to find replacement staff quickly and would have no
experience of
operating
in the South; there was therefore a risk that the “majority of
effort” would fail.
A clear UK
proposal might head off any such planning.
902.
Sir Hilary
advised that he had discussed the options with Sir Michael Jay
and
Gen Jackson
during their recent visits.
903.
The DFID paper
on the links between the political process and reconstruction
was
tabled at
the 30 January meeting of the ISG.520
904.
The paper,
which drew on comments from Sir Hilary Synnott, Mr Bearpark,
the
FCO and the
Treasury, identified three potential flashpoints:
•
Unemployment.
90 percent of demonstrations were about jobs or
salaries.
Estimates
of unemployment ranged from 20 to 50 percent. Structural
problems
518
Manuscript
comment Blair on Paper, [undated],‘Iraq: The Next Six
Months’.
519
Telegram 9
CPA(South) to FCO London, 22 January 2004, ‘South Iraq after 30
June’.
520
Letter
Drummond to Dodd, 29 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction and the
Political Process’ attaching
Paper DFID,
‘Iraq: Reconstruction and the Political Process’; Minute Dodd to
Sheinwald, 2 February 2004,
‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
155