Executive
Summary
403.
In July 2004,
Lord Butler’s Report stated that his Committee was:
“...
concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the
Government’s
procedures
which we saw in the context of policy‑making towards Iraq risks
reducing
the scope
for informed collective political judgement. Such risks are
particularly
significant
in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts are
inherently
difficult
to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all the
more
404.
In response,
Mr Blair agreed that:
“... where
a small group is brought together to work on operational military
planning
and
developing the diplomatic strategy, in future such a group will
operate formally
as an ad
hoc Cabinet Committee.”188
405.
The Inquiry
considers that where policy options include significant
military
deployments,
particularly where they will have implications for the
responsibilities of
more than
one Cabinet Minister, are likely to be controversial, and/or are
likely to give
rise to
significant risks, the options should be considered by a group of
Ministers meeting
regularly,
whether or not they are formally designated as a Cabinet Committee,
so that
Cabinet as
a whole can be enabled to take informed collective
decisions.
406.
Describing the
important function a Cabinet Committee can play, Mr Powell
wrote:
“Most of
the important decisions of the Blair Government were taken either
in
informal
meetings of Ministers and officials or by Cabinet Committees ...
Unlike
the full
Cabinet, a Cabinet Committee has the right people present,
including,
for
example, the military Chiefs of Staff or scientific advisers, its
members are
well
briefed, it can take as long as it likes over its discussion on the
basis of
well‑prepared
papers, and it is independently chaired by a senior Minister
with
no departmental
vested interest.”189
407.
The Inquiry
concurs with this description of the function of a Cabinet
Committee
when it is
working well. In particular, it recognises the important function
which a
Minister
without departmental responsibilities for the issues under
consideration can
play.
This can provide some external challenge from experienced
members of the
government
and mitigate any tendency towards group‑think. In the case of Iraq,
for
example,
the inclusion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or Deputy Prime
Minister,
as senior
members of the Cabinet, or of Mr Cook, as a former Foreign
Secretary known
to have
concerns about the policy, could have provided an element of
challenge.
187
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898.
188
Cabinet
Office, Review on
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implementation of
its
Conclusions, March
2005, Cm6492.
189
Powell
J. The New
Machiavelli: How to wield power in the modern world.
The Bodley
Head, 2010.
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