The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
53.
The Kurds were
“content with the status quo”. They had “a significant degree
of
independence
and, as the Kurds did not contribute to compensation payments from
OFF
revenue to
Kuwait, they had done “disproportionately well from OFF”. Their
goal was
“significant
autonomy
in a
federal Iraq”. They remained “wary of backing US
military
action too
openly”.
54.
The Iraqi
regime was “relatively sanguine about the risk of opposition” in
the
South, and
deemed the “main threat” to be “from SCIRI
[Supreme
Council for Islamic
Revolution
in Iraq] and its military wing, the Badr
Corps”. The UK
lacked “reliable
intelligence
on the size and attitudes of particular tribes in southern
Iraq”.
55.
Mr Scarlett
concluded:
“… until
the regime’s military and security forces have been significantly
weakened
by external
attack, neither SCIRI nor these tribal insurgents can present a
significant
threat to
regime control. Once the regime’s security and military apparatus
begins
to crack,
however, a more general uprising is quite possible, as in 1991.
Only
a credible
coalition attack with the clear intention of finishing off the
regime will
overcome
the local population’s natural sense of caution. After all, the
precedent of
1991 showed
that the regime was allowed brutally to re‑establish its control
without
significant
interference from coalition forces.”
56.
In response to
a request from Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of
Staff,
Mr Scarlett
also sent Mr Blair “classified reading material on Iraq”
produced by the US,
and the
following documents produced by the Defence Intelligence Staff
(DIS):
•
‘Removing
Saddam’, an evaluation of options for removing Saddam produced
in
March 2002
(see Section 6.1);
•
‘The Iraqi
Defence Profile’, an overview of Iraq focusing particularly on
Iraq’s
military
and security organisations, produced in 1999;
•
‘Proliferation
Study of Iraq’, an in‑depth study of each of Iraq’s programmes
to
develop
weapons of mass destruction, produced in August 2002;
•
an ‘aide
memoire on WMD and Proliferation’, including Iraq, produced
in
June
2002;
•
‘Profile:
Saddam Hussein’, produced in April 2001;
•
‘The Iraqi
Tribes: Their Identity and Role in Internal Security’, produced
in
June
2002;
•
‘The Iraqi
Ba’ath Party’, produced in February 2002;
•
‘The Iraqi
Opposition’, produced in June 2002; and
•
‘Infrastructure
Briefing Memorandum’, produced in January 2002.17
17
Minute
Scarlett to Powell, 1 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Classified Reading
Material’.
102