The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
acquisition
of uranium and examining issues in relation to aluminium tubes and
magnets.
On HMX, the
IAEA might be unable to reach a final conclusion:
“While we
have no indication that this material was used for any
application
other than
declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of verifying …
the
declared
use …”
379.
In relation to
“documents found on 16 January in the private residence of an
Iraqi
scientist”,
the IAEA had “completed a more detailed review”. The documents
related
“predominantly
to lasers, including the use of laser technology to enrich
uranium”.
“Nothing”
in the documents altered “the conclusions previously drawn by the
IAEA”
about the
extent of Iraq’s laser enrichment programme.
380.
Iraq had also
provided documentation about questions and concerns
which
had
remained since 1998 about weapons and centrifuge design, but the
documents
contained
“no new information”. Dr ElBaradei hoped that “the new Iraqi
commissions
… will be
able to discover documents and other evidence that could assist in
clarifying
remaining
questions and concerns”.
381.
Dr ElBaradei
stated that the IAEA would continue to expand its
capabilities
to “strengthen
and accelerate” its ability to investigate matters of concern, and
to
“reinstate
and reinforce” its monitoring and verification system.
382.
Dr ElBaradei
had “reported on numerous occasions” that the IAEA
had:
“… by
December 1998 … concluded that it had neutralised Iraq’s past
nuclear
programme
and that therefore no unresolved disarmament issues remained
…
Hence, our
focus since the resumption of inspections … has been verifying
whether
Iraq
revived its nuclear programme in the intervening
years.
“We have to
date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or
nuclear-related
activities
in Iraq. However … a number of issues are still under investigation
… we
intend to
make full use of the authority granted to us … to build as much
capacity
into the
inspection process as necessary.
“In that
context, I would underline the importance of information that
States may
be able to
provide to help us in assessing the accuracy and completeness
of
information
provided by Iraq.”
383.
Dr ElBaradei
concluded that it was:
“… possible
with an intrusive verification system, to assess the presence or
absence
of a
nuclear weapons programme … even without the full co-operation of
the
inspected
State.
“However,
prompt, full and active co-operation by Iraq as required under
resolution
1441 (2002)
will speed up the process. More importantly, it will enable us to
reach
the high
degree of assurance required by the Security Council in the case of
Iraq
248