The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

427.  It would neither be necessary nor feasible to seek a mandate from Cabinet at

each stage of a discussion. That reinforces the importance of ensuring Cabinet is kept

informed as strategy evolves, is given the opportunity to raise questions and is asked to

endorse key decisions. Cabinet Ministers need more information than will be available

from the media, especially on sensitive issues of foreign and security policy.

428.  In 2009, three former Cabinet Secretaries197 told the House of Lords Select

Committee on the Constitution:

“... each of us, as Secretary of the Cabinet, has been constantly conscious of his

responsibility to the Cabinet collectively and of the need to have regard to the needs

and responsibilities of the other members of the Cabinet (and indeed of other

Ministers) as well of those of the Prime Minister. That has coloured our relationships

with Number 10 as well as those with other Ministers and their departments.”198

429.  Lord Turnbull told the Inquiry that Mr Blair:

“... wanted a step change in the work on delivery and reform, which I hope

I managed to give him. Now ... how does the Cabinet Secretary work? You come

in and you are – even with the two roles that you have, head of an organisation of

half a million civil servants and in some sense co‑ordinating a public sector of about

five million people. You have to make choices as to where you make your effort, and

I think the policy I followed was not to take an issue over from someone to whom

it was delegated simply because it was big and important, but you have to make a

judgement as to whether it is being handled competently, whether that particular part

is, in a sense, under pressure, whether you think they are getting it wrong in some

sense, or they are missing certain important things.”199

430.  The responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary to ensure that members of Cabinet are

fully engaged in ways that allow them to accept collective responsibility and to meet their

departmental obligations nevertheless remains.

Advice on the legal basis for military action

431.  The Inquiry has reviewed the debate that took place within the Government and

how it reached its decision.

432.  The circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis

for UK participation were far from satisfactory.

433.  It was not until 13 March 2003 that Lord Goldsmith advised that there was,

on balance, a secure legal basis for military action.

197 Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, Lord Butler of Brockwell and Lord Wilson of Dinton.

198 Fourth Report from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Session 2009‑10,

The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government, HL Paper 30.

199 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 3.

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