10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

significant role in Iraq’s reconstruction, and highlighting in general terms the capability

of UK companies.535

Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Dr Rice on 19 February, in similar terms.536

Mr Blair wrote to President Bush on 5 March, identifying some of the UK companies

bidding for PMO contracts and highlighting in general terms the expertise of

UK companies.537

The Annotated Agenda for the 18 March meeting of the AHMGIR reported that following

a campaign of high-level lobbying, UK companies had “achieved success” in the latest

round of US reconstruction contracting.538 Three project management contracts, with

a total value of up to US$80m, had been awarded to consortia with significant UK

components and two design and build construction contracts, with a total value of up to

US$1.1bn, had been awarded to consortia with significant UK components. It was not

possible at this stage to calculate the exact value to UK companies of those contracts.

Ministers were advised on 2 April that consortia with significant UK components had

secured three further design and build contracts, with a total value of US$1.6bn.539

927. The FCO sent No.10 an update on efforts to improve the CPA’s media operation

and the Iraqi Media Network (recently re-branded as Al Iraqiya) on 11 February.540

928. The FCO advised that the CPA still lacked a fully developed, overarching

communications strategy but did have strategies for specific areas of activity including

the political process. Mr Rob Tappan had been brought in from the US State Department

to try to develop an overarching communications strategy and a further 30 US staff

would arrive shortly, bringing the CPA’s Strategic Communications team to around 100.

However, little thought had been given to whether these additions were necessary or

even desirable: “Manpower is flowing without a clear plan to harness it.”

929. There were four UK press officers in CPA(Baghdad), two in CPA(South), and one

each in Basra, Wasit and Kirkuk. The US had not responded to the UK’s offer of a senior

UK press officer.

930. The FCO concluded:

“IraqRep [Sir Jeremy Greenstock] advises that we will not achieve anything by

adding further UK press officers to an already overpopulated, and undermanaged,

operation. Nor does IraqRep believe there is any mileage in trying again to insert

a senior British communications expert into the [CPA’s] Strategic Communications

team: this is Tappan’s role and the Americans are likely to resist UK involvement

in this area, which they see more and more narrowly in terms of US image and

535 Letter Straw to Powell, 17 February 2004, [untitled].

536 Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 19 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Contracts’.

537 Letter Blair to Bush, 5 March 2004, [untitled].

538 Annotated Agenda, 17 March 2004, Cabinet Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

539 Letter Dodd to Owen, 2 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Update’ attaching Paper Cabinet Office, 2 April 2004, ‘Iraq:

Update’.

540 Letter Owen to Cannon, 11 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Media and Communications’.

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