6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
124.
Mr Watkins
summarised the content of Mr Rycroft’s letter and Mr Hoon’s views
in
a minute to
Mr Lee commissioning further work on the issues so that the MOD
would be
able to
respond to No.10 “by the end of the month”.34
125.
The Secretary
to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (SECCOS) produced a
record
of the
discussion, circulated within the MOD on 22 January, which was
described as
complementing
the record of the discussion produced by No.10.35
126.
An
“unofficial” PJHQ account, with the scripts and presentation slides
used,
was
prepared and sent to Lt Gen Reith, who was in the Middle East
at a CENTCOM
Commanders’
Conference.36
127.
Adm Boyce
advised Mr Blair that the military plan would work.
128.
There was
no recorded discussion of either the risks of the
amphibious
operation
in the initial phase of an attack or the readiness of UK
forces.
129.
Adm Boyce’s
briefing notes identified that the US had seen “UK participation
as
essential
from the outset”.37
The US had
“accommodated our constraints at every turn
to ensure
we are part of their coalition and to guarantee a serious military
task for our
forces. In
fact, the current plan … makes them a lynchpin
crucial to success of the
overall
plan.” The UK
would, however, rely heavily on US enabling assets.
130.
A “convincing,
coherent military build-up” leaving Saddam Hussein in no
doubt
about the
consequences of non-compliance with UNSCR 1441 (“force on
mind”)
was
the best
way of applying pressure.
131.
Gen Franks was
working to produce a “loaded and cocked” winning capability
from
15 February
with the US able to commence an air campaign and some ground
offensive
operations
(possibly including the UK) from 3 March and the main effort
starting within
two weeks
on 19 March, although the US was looking to bring that
forward.
132.
The UK’s
interest was to be “ready to engage from the outset”, and the
briefing
stated that
US “timelines” had driven the UK’s. If the UK was to match the US
timetable,
the MOD
would need permission by 17 January to be ready to start deploying
land force
equipment
from 24 January. The deployment to the Gulf would add 3,000 miles
to their
journey and
port access in Kuwait would be limited.
133.
Mr Blair was
advised that the UK could maintain its ability to use the
forces
deployed
for six months, but if they were not used it could then take up to
a year before
they would
be in a position to take action.
34
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
35
Minute
SECCOS to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 22 January 2003, ‘Record of
the Meeting Between
the Prime
Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Discuss Op TELIC: 15 Jan
03’.
36
Minute
MA/DCJO(Ops) to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to the Prime
Minister’.
37
Minute
MA/DCJO(Ops) to MA/CJO, 15 January 2003, ‘Briefing to the Prime
Minister’ attaching Briefing
[unattributed
and undated], ‘Brief to PM – 1715 Wed 15 Jan 03’.
405