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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
21.  Mr Blair sent a minute to Mr Jonathan Powell, his Chief of Staff, on 17 March setting
out three points in response to the briefing papers that he had received:
“(1) In all my papers I do not have a proper worked-out strategy on how we would
do it. The US do not either, but before I go [to Crawford], I need to be able to
provide them with a far more intelligent and detailed analysis of a game plan …
(2) The persuasion job on this seems very tough …
(3) Oil prices. This is my big domestic worry. We must concert with the US to get
action from others to push the price back down. Higher petrol prices really might
put the public off.”11
A copy of the minute was sent to Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser
and Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec) in the Cabinet Office.
22.  Asked to clarify what “it” was that required a proper worked-out strategy, Mr Blair
told the Inquiry: “How we would either get Saddam to cease being a threat peacefully
or to get him out by force.”12
23.  Mr Michael Arthur, FCO Economic Director, sent Sir David a paper on the economic
effects of military action against Iraq on 26 March.13 Mr Arthur assessed that:
“Iraq produces c2.5m bpd, a bit over 3 percent of world supply. Military action may
well lead to a reduction or cut-off in its exports either directly or by way of Iraqi
retaliation.
“There is likely to be an immediate spike in oil prices … provided the conflict does
not spill over into the Gulf and threaten the flow of supplies through the Straits of
Hormuz – the spike could be very short-lived.”
24.  A protracted, regional conflict would pose a more serious threat to oil prices and
the world economy.
25.  The paper also highlighted the economic consequences for Iraq’s neighbours,
particularly Jordan.
26.  Mr John Scarlett, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), responded
to a request from Sir David for an update on Iraq’s oil production, the importance of oil
revenue to the Iraqi regime, and the effect of a halt in Iraqi oil exports on the world oil
market, on 4 April.14
11 Minute Prime Minister to Powell, 17 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
12 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 43.
13 Letter Arthur to Manning, 26 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Back Pocket Economics’.
14 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 4 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Oil’.
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