10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
maximum
transparency in this area. They readily agreed to set up a joint
working
group to
examine these issues.”57
109.
Mr Chaplin
advised Mr Straw that: “Given that military action could start
within a
few weeks,
we agreed to have the first meetings of these [working] groups next
week,
110.
Reports from
the British Embassy Washington in late January highlighted
the
question of
who would manage the oil sector in the post-conflict
period.
111.
A joint
MOD/Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) delegation attended
a
Phase IV
planning conference at CENTCOM from 23 to 24
January.59
The
conference
considered
Phase IV planning in more detail than the 22 January
talks.
112.
The British
Embassy Washington reported on the discussions on Phase
IV
issues.60
The “Energy
and Infrastructure Planning Group” based in DoD was
co-ordinating
work on the oil sector. A comprehensive plan had been presented
to
President
Bush. A specialised contractor had been identified to carry out
emergency
repairs. It
had still not been decided “who or what” would be in overall charge
of the
oil sector,
although President Bush had agreed that a “CEO” would be
needed.
113.
The Embassy
reported that the “underlying” US objective was to get
“operations
back in the
hands of the local workforce as soon as possible”. The US
Administration
recognised
the need to restore oil production and exports to generate revenue;
the
aim was to
“quickly achieve” 2.1m bpd, and to be prepared to increase
production
to 3.1m bpd.
114.
A BP team
briefed UK Government officials on prospects for the Iraq energy
sector
on 23
January.61
The
briefing identified “two opposing views current in
Washington”,
which it
characterised as “hawkish” (espoused by the DoD, the NSC and
others)
and
“doveish” (espoused by the US State Department). The hawkish view
sought a
significant
increase in Iraqi oil production to push down oil prices,
privatisation within
the oil
sector, and external engagement led by the US (and possibly the UK)
rather than
the UN.
115.
The BP team
estimated that Iraqi oil production could rise from around 2.8m
bpd
currently
to around 3.5m bpd within two years and 4m bpd within five years.
Significant
investment
was required. UK officials pressed the BP team on whether this
“fairly slow”
increase
could be accelerated.
57
Telegram 89
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US/UK/Australia
Consultations on
Day After
Issues: 22 January 2003’.
58
Minute
Chaplin to Secretary of State, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: ‘Day-After’
Issues’.
59
Minute DOMA
AD(ME) and Sec(0)4 to MA/DCDS(C), 27 January 2003, ‘US Iraq
Reconstruction
Conference
– Tampa 23-24 Jan 03’.
60
Teleletter
FCO [junior official] to Chilcott, 25 January 2003, ‘US/Iraq:
CENTCOM Meeting on Day After
Reconstruction
Issues, 23 January 2003’.
61
Record, 23
January 2003, ‘Iraqi Energy Sector: Issues and
Prospects’.
391