4.4 | The
search for WMD
need for
careful co-ordination of public lines with the UK, but tensions
between different
interests
in Washington meant that would be difficult. Close personal contact
with
Dr Rice
and Mr Tenet would be important.
449.
US General
John Abizaid, Commander CENTCOM, called on Mr Blair
on
5 September.247
Mr Blair
commented that he had “more than a passing interest in
what
turned up
on WMD”. Gen Abizaid reported that the ISG’s HUMINT effort was
starting to
tell and
that there was “stuff buried all over the country”.
450.
At
Mr Powell’s request, Mr Scarlett updated No.10 on the
search for WMD
possibly concealed
in Lake Qadisiyah, behind the Haditha Dam on the
Euphrates.248
A Royal
Navy team was due to arrive there on 5 September to assess the
situation.
“There have
been a number of reports, of varying degrees of reliability, that
WMD
may have
been concealed in lakes, reservoirs, canals and rivers by Iraqi
military or
security
organisations. Several reports record local gossip. Certain
locations feature
in reports
from a number of sources, some with apparently good access or with
an
established
record of reliable reporting.”
452.
The ISG
completed the search of Lake Qadisiyah on
14 September.249
No
WMD-related material was found.
453.
The JIC
discussed the draft ISG Interim Report on
10 September.
It concluded
that the draft contained little that was new and that
handling
of the
report would be vital.
454.
The JIC
considered a Discussion Note, ‘Iraqi WMD: The Emerging Picture’,
on
10 September.250
The minutes
recorded that the main points made were:
“a) the
first progress report from the ISG contained little new. Whilst
there had been
some
progress on missiles and a coherent story on nuclear weapons, there
was still
a serious
lack of hard evidence on CB. There had been a lot of collusion
between
Iraqi
former officials under questioning and clear attempts to identify
the limits of our
knowledge
in order to calibrate the information they gave … sources were
being
intimidated
and fear was a big factor with those working in the CB area;
and
“b) the
handling of the report would be vital. It was highly desirable to
avoid
publishing
an unclassified version, which would not only display the limits
of
247
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with General Abizaid’.
248
Minute
Scarlett to Cannon, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Underwater
Concealment of WMD’.
249
Op
ROCKINGHAM Daily, 15 September 2003.
250
Minutes,
10 September 2003, JIC meeting.
515