The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
249.
Discussion had
been dominated by Iraq, and Mr Straw had explained UK
priorities
as:
“… having
extended OFF, building up Security Council consensus for a
heavyweight
UN Special
Representative, and tackling the range of issues linked to
suspension of
sanctions.
On the question of supervising oil revenues, one possibility would
be the
UN
Secretary-General. Another could be the World Bank before a genuine
IIA could
take this
on.”
250.
Mr de Villepin
had responded that he could only envisage the UN overseeing
oil
sales with
any credibility.
251.
A further US
draft of the Phase IV resolution was sent by Mr Bellinger to Sir
David
Manning on
28 April.137
Its text
included:
•
Endorsement
of the CPA’s role in administering Iraq, including the
destruction
of WMD.
•
A request
that the UN appoint a Special Co-ordinator to
co-ordinate
humanitarian
and reconstruction activities.
•
Support for
an Iraqi-led process for creating the IIA, helped by the CPA
and
working
with the Special Co-ordinator.
•
Creation of
an Iraqi Development Fund, to be used by the CPA, and the
transfer
of unspent
OFF programme funds into it.
•
The
resumption of oil sales at market price, with all proceeds
deposited in the
Iraqi
Development Fund.
252.
Sir David
Manning and Dr Rice spoke on the afternoon of 28
April.138
253.
Sir David
reported to Mr McDonald that he said “we were pretty clear here
that the
omnibus
text as currently drafted was non-negotiable in New
York”.
254.
A further US
draft was promised the following day, drafted so that it
could
be broken
into separate components if necessary, and it was agreed that a
video
conference
with “the experts to hand” would be arranged “to discuss the whole
gamut
of UN
issues”.
255.
Mr Blair and
President Bush spoke by telephone during the evening of 28
April.139
256.
Mr Blair
indicated that he was still considering the UN angle; an omnibus
resolution
would be
fine if achievable, but if not the focus should be on areas where
progress could
be made. Mr
Blair said that the Coalition “did not want to be the supplicants,
just to
obtain the
maximum UN cover without jeopardizing the Coalition’s
achievements”.
137
Letter
Bellinger to Manning, 28 April 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper,
[undated], ‘Resolution on
post‑conflict
Iraq’.
138
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 28 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
139
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 28 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 28 April’.
172