The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
654.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 11 April that regime change in Iraq was greatly to
be
desired but
no plans for achieving that had been tabled during his
discussions
with
President Bush at Crawford.
655.
Reflecting
Mr Straw’s advice, Mr Blair emphasised to Cabinet on 11 April
that
it would be
important for the Government not to “tie its hands” in relation to
the
need for a
further Security Council resolution.
656.
Mr Blair
had stated publicly that doing nothing was not an option, and
that
the threat
from Iraq had to be dealt with.
657.
Mr Blair
suggested that the US Government recognised the need to
embark
on a
process involving a clear ultimatum and an effort to gather
international
consensus
for action.
658.
Mr Blair
did not disclose that he had informed Vice President Cheney
on
11 March
that the UK would help the US to achieve its objective of regime
change
provided
that there was a clever plan.
659.
Mr Blair
reported his discussions with President Bush to Cabinet on 11
April.242
He told
colleagues that the talks with President Bush had been dominated by
events
in Israel
and the Occupied Territories.
660.
On Iraq, Mr
Blair said that the US Government wanted to see a change of
regime,
which was
greatly to be desired. No plans for achieving that had, however,
been tabled.
The
significance of the crisis in Israel and the Occupied Territories
for policy in Iraq was
recognised.
He had consulted his hosts about his speech, at College Station on
7 April,
which had
made clear that Iraq should unconditionally permit UN weapons
inspectors to
return.
That suggested the US Government recognised the need to embark on a
process
involving a
clear ultimatum and an effort to gather international consensus for
action.
661.
In the
subsequent discussion a number of points were made. Those
included:
•
A UN
resolution would be helpful in cementing support both
internationally and
in the UK
for any military action against the Iraqi regime. It would,
however,
be
important not to become boxed in by stating that a UN Security
Council
resolution
would be a necessary pre-condition for military action against
the
Iraqi regime.
•
Saddam
Hussein was in breach of nine UN resolutions. He could avert action
by
the
international community if he were to abide by those
resolutions.
•
It was
important to encourage the US to remain engaged in the Middle East
and
to take
account of the concerns of the international community, including
the
Secretary-General
of the UN.
242
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 April 2002.
508