1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
determine”.2
There is no
suggestion in the Charter of a residual right for
individual
Members to
enforce Security Council decisions.
Article 51
provides that nothing in the Charter should impair the inherent
right of individual
or
collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack on a Member
State, until the
Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and
security.
Although a State may act in self-defence without prior
authorisation, it is required
immediately
to report such action to the Security Council; and such action
would not in
any way
affect the authority of the Security Council. The intention to
exercise overarching
Security
Council control, is apparent.
The scheme
of the Charter, against which all resolutions should be viewed for
the proper
understanding
of their terms, suggests both that authorisations to States to use
force to
enforce a
Security Council decision in the context of a threat to
international peace are
extremely
rare, and that they occur only with the clear agreement of the
Security Council.
The
Security Council, however, has rarely engaged directly in efforts
to resolve individual
conflicts.
Its involvement in containing Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait and
its subsequent
liberation
in 1991 was unusual.
17.
Iraq did not
comply with resolution 678. Discussions in Geneva
between
Mr James Baker
(the US Secretary of State) and Mr Tariq Aziz (the Iraqi
Foreign Minister),
and in
Baghdad between Mr Perez de Cuellar (the UN Secretary-General)
and
Saddam Hussein,
were unsuccessful.
18.
On
14 January 1991, Saddam Hussein called on the Iraqi people to
fight to the
death to
hold on to Kuwait. The coalition began the military operation to
liberate Kuwait,
named
Operation Desert Storm, on 17 January. The coalition comprised
42 States. In
addition to
the US and UK, 13 countries, including France and a number of Arab
and
Gulf
States, took part in offensive operations. The campaign began with
air strikes,
with the
objective of:
•
disrupting
Iraq’s command, control and communications;
•
destroying
Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical warfare
capability;
•
severing
supply routes to Kuwait; and
•
attacking
Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
19.
From
mid-February, Russia sought to broker a deal for the withdrawal of
Iraq from
Kuwait, but
Iraq’s conditions were unacceptable to the Security Council. In a
final effort
to obtain
Iraqi compliance, coalition governments issued a statement on
22 February
setting out
the conditions which Iraq needed to meet to bring about a cessation
of
2
In
resolution 221 (1966) the Security Council authorised the UK “to
prevent, by the use of force, if
necessary”
the arrival at Beira of vessels believed to be carrying oil
destined for Southern Rhodesia,
and empowered
the UK to arrest and detain the tanker Joanna
V upon
departure from Beira.
27