12.1  |  Security Sector Reform

• The US planned to conduct one unannounced search per week, starting the

following week.

• The Judicial Commission was carrying out a separate investigation, and was

working through the case files of every detainee in Jadiriyah.

• Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)/Badr had begun to “push

back” against accusations of detainee abuse.

776.  In early 2006, the MOI began establishing an abuse complaint process system

involving the Inspector General, Internal Affairs and a Public Affairs Office.725 Detention

was a particular cause of concern. The DoD’s May 2006 Report to Congress stated:

“Many human rights violations occur at detention centres because the centres have

inadequate facilities. The centres have no places to shower, pray, or prepare food;

plumbing and electrical systems are substandard. Furthermore, the police are not

trained as jailers … To date the Joint Iraqi Inspection Committee, consisting of Iraqi

Inspectors General from various ministries, supported by the US Embassy and

MNF‑I, has inspected seven facilities.”

777.  A junior official at the British Embassy Washington emailed IPU on 17 March with a

summary of a meeting with US officials.726 She noted that it had been agreed that the UK

and US should confront Prime Minister Ja’afari about any efforts to suppress evidence

from the Jadiriyah bunker report.

778.  Dr Reid visited Iraq from 17 to 20 March.727 A report of his visit from his Private

Office on 21 March referred to a meeting with Mr Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Ambassador

to Iraq, in which Dr Reid was told that the US investigation into the Jadiriyah facility had

“concluded terrible abuses had taken place and that senior figures were likely to have

been aware of them”. A copy of the US investigation report had gone to Prime Minister

Ja’afari but “nothing seemed to have come of it”, although they said they had not

“pushed that hard”.

779.  The minutes of DOP(I) on 30 March recorded that Dr Kim Howells, FCO Minister,

had stated:

“… the UK and the US had to press Ja’afari to publish an unexpurgated version of

the report into abuse by the Ministry of Interior at the Jadiriyah bunker, and be ready

to press the new Iraqi Government to take action against those responsible … Our

legacy could not be to construct an edifice in Iraq based on human rights abuses.”728

725  Report to Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.

726  Email FCO [junior official] to FCO [junior official], 17 March 2006, ‘Briefing for DCDS(C) – Iraq –

Detainees and Abuse’.

727  Minute APS/SoS [MOD] to PS/Policy Director [MOD], 21 March 2006, ‘Secretary of State’s visit to Iraq’.

728  Minutes, 30 March 2006, DOP(I) meeting.

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