The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• The international community should proceed in a measured and

determined way to decide how to respond to the real threat represented

by the Iraqi regime.

• No decision to launch further military action had been taken and any

action taken would be in accordance with international law.

227. As agreed the previous week, Cabinet discussed Iraq on 7 March.79

228. Mr Straw told Cabinet that “in view of the current media speculation about military

action in Iraq, it was important to remind his colleagues of the background to the current

situation”. President Saddam Hussein had launched “an unprovoked invasion of Kuwait

in 1990”. Following his defeat in 1991, 27 separate obligations had been imposed on

Iraq by the UN Security Council; Saddam Hussein’s regime had met only three. The:

“… regime continued to pose a threat to peace through its development of weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them. United Nations weapons

inspectors had been forced to leave Iraq in 1998 because they were close to

exposing the full extent of … Saddam Hussein’s programmes. Iraq’s neighbours

were concerned about the threat to peace posed by … Saddam … but feared that

military action which did not result in his removal would strengthen his position.”

229. Mr Straw continued:

“… sanctions imposed by the United Nations were not preventing food and other

humanitarian goods from reaching Iraq. Contracts to the value of $30 billion had

been approved under the Oil-for-Food programme … The United Kingdom alone

had given £100 million in humanitarian aid to Iraq. Negotiations were … in train

to change the sanctions regime so that, with the exception of those military and

dual‑use goods included on a Goods Review List, all goods could be imported

… without the prior approval of the United Nations. President Saddam Hussein’s

regime had to comply fully with all relevant … Security Council resolutions, including

the elimination of all WMD … to normalise its relations …”

230. Mr Straw concluded:

“No decision had been taken on launching further military action against the Iraqi

regime, but it was important to ensure that the British public and international

opinion understood the true nature of the threat posed by the regime and the need

to respond effectively.”

79 Cabinet Conclusions, 7 March 2002.

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