The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Aldouri
stated that Iraq had taken the initiative of opening a dialogue
with Mr Annan.
That had
achieved “some progress” but the US had exerted pressure “which
prevented
the Council
from participating in efforts to seek a comprehensive
solution”.
515.
The Iraqi
Government had “agreed, unconditionally, to the return” of
inspectors
on 16
September and agreed arrangements with Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei in Vienna
for the return
of inspectors by 19 October. The US had hampered those
arrangements
by “calling
for the imposition of unfair, impossible and arbitrary conditions
on Iraq”.
516.
Mr Aldouri
concluded by reiterating that Iraq “had pledged to co‑operate
with
inspectors
in every possible way so as to facilitate their task of
ascertaining” there were
“no weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq”. There was “absolutely no need for
adoption
of a
new Security Council resolution”.
517.
Following the
statements by non‑members of the Security Council, Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
set out the UK position in his speech on 17 October. He stated that
the
issues
being debated went much wider than Iraq and included:
•
“the
security of the whole neighbourhood of Iraq”;
•
“the
reinforcement of our collective effort to eliminate
terrorism”;
•
“justice
for Palestine and security for Israel within the law”;
•
“the role
of the Security Council when serious matters of national security
are
before its
members”; and
•
“the
overall effectiveness of the United Nations itself”.
518.
Sir Jeremy
emphasised that the UK’s “firm objective” was “the
complete
disarmament
of Iraq in the area of weapons of mass destruction, by peaceful
means”,
and “a
peaceful resolution to the current crisis surrounding Iraq”. But
ensuring that there
was such a
solution lay “in the hands of Iraq”.
519.
Addressing
Iraq’s response to the conditions of the cease‑fire in 1991, Sir
Jeremy
stated that
Iraq remained “in material breach of these obligations”. He
added:
“We all
know of the myriad ways in which Iraq sought, almost immediately
after
inspections
began to frustrate inspections and intimidate
inspectors.
“We all
know of the succession of allegedly final declarations … We all
know that
Iraq tried
to limit and hinder inspections to the extent that in August 1998
the then
head of …
UNSCOM said it was impossible for him to do his job. We all know
of
the
outstanding weapons of mass destruction for which UNSCOM was unable
to
account. We
all know of the multiple warnings sent to Iraq …
“No shadow
of a doubt remains that Iraq has defied the United Nations
…
“Iraq could
have invited inspectors back without conditions at any time …
Sanctions
could have
been lifted … Only Baghdad’s insistence on retaining weapons of
mass
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