6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
to
Ankara.511
The US and
UK were discussing possible roles for UK forces in the
South.
The UK was
“ready to play a significant role there, provided it made sense in
terms of
the overall
plan”.
1342.
Mr Westmacott’s
overview of the visit reported that although Turkish
interlocutors
had spelled
out their concerns, they had given “tentative agreement to the
start of
military
planning talks”.512
1343.
The British
Embassy Ankara reported that Mr Hoon had told all his
interlocutors
that “the
UK, like Turkey, wanted a peaceful outcome to the crisis if
possible; but our
best chance
of achieving it lay in making a credible show of coalition
readiness to use
force if
necessary”.
1344.
The UK
“understood” Turkish concerns:
“… about
legitimacy (which we shared), domestic and regional politics. But
we
needed to
start high level military planning talks now if Saddam Hussein was
to get
the
message. We and the United States were also convinced that, if
military action
proved
necessary, it would be quicker, cleaner, and more effective if it
was done
with the
support and facilitation of Turkey. A northern route land forces
option …
with a
thrust from the South, made the most sense … UK military
involvement was
under consideration.”
1345.
Mr Hoon
was advised to lodge a formal request.
1346.
Records of the
meetings in Ankara on 8 January circulated by
Mr Watkins
demonstrated
that Mr Hoon had argued that the UK objectives published on 7
January
were
similar to Turkey’s objectives:
“… we too
wished to avoid war. But we had to demonstrate the seriousness of
our
intent …
Visible military preparations might make war less
likely.”513
1347.
The UK was in
close touch with CENTCOM on a possible land package
and
Adm Boyce
was “ready to come out to discuss the details”.
1348.
The Turkish
response was guarded. It had a number of concerns about
the
political,
economic and humanitarian consequences of military action. All
chances for
a peaceful
resolution had to be exhausted. There was no public support for a
war and,
therefore,
no guarantee of Parliamentary support.
1349.
Mr Hoon
wrote to the Turkish Defence Minister on 9 January seeking
confirmation
of approval
for early military planning talks.514
511
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 7 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Rumsfeld’.
512
Telegram 8
Ankara to FCO London, 8 January 2003, ‘Defence Secretary’s Visit to
Ankara: Overview’.
513
Letters
Watkins to Manning, 9 and 10 January 2003, ‘Defence Secretary’s
Visit to Ankara:
8 January
2003’.
514
Telegram 19
Ankara to FCO London, 15 January 2003, ‘Follow‑up to Defence
Secretary’s Visit’.
373