3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

193. Mr Ricketts advised Mr Straw that possible elements for a resolution included

an ultimatum (to allow the possibility of persuading Saddam Hussein to leave to be

explored) and a possible reference to a further resolution authorising post-conflict work.

194. Mr Ricketts suggested that the right channel for discussing text with the US

would be through the UN Missions in New York, and highlighted the need for an

intensive campaign, in close co-ordination with the US, to lobby other members

of the Security Council.

195. Mr Straw endorsed the recommendations.52

196. Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that he had reassured Mr Annan that it was

unlikely that the UK would circulate a draft resolution the following week.53 There were

likely to be difficulties in the Council.

197. In a discussion with Ambassador John Negroponte, US Permanent Representative

to the UN, Sir Jeremy had emphasised the importance of a draft which “helped bring

people on board”. That would determine whether to include an ultimatum and whether

to mention “serious consequences” or “all necessary means”.

198. Mr Straw’s Private Office forwarded advice on the timings and tactics for a second

resolution to Sir David Manning on 10 February.54

199. The FCO advised:

• Only four votes in the Security Council (the US, UK, Bulgaria and Spain) could

be “counted on” for a second resolution.

• Russia, Chile and Pakistan could be “moving in our direction” and China also

seemed “to be moving away from a veto”.

• France, Germany and Syria remained “strongly opposed” and Mexico was

“highly sceptical”. The position of France and President Chirac was described

as “heavily dependent on strength of evidence”.

• Guinea, Cameroon and Angola might be “coming round to supporting a second

resolution but needed working on”.

200. The FCO provided a more detailed matrix summarising the positions of the UN

Security Council members with proposals for further lobbying by the UK and others, but

concluded that “without more dramatic evidence of Iraqi non-compliance, most members

of the UNSC will remain non-committal”.

201. On the text of a second resolution, the FCO advised that it would be “impossible

to obtain support for a second resolution explicitly authorising ‘all necessary means’”.

52 Manuscript comment Straw on Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003,

‘Iraq Strategy’.

53 Telegram 228 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 February 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: 7 February’.

54 Letter Owen to Manning, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Second Resolution’.

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