4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
321.
Other
statements in the section included:
•
Iraq could
“deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive
range
of artillery
shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic
missiles”.
•
“Intelligence
from reliable and well-informed sources has become available
in
the last
few weeks. This has confirmed that Iraq has chemical and
biological
weapons and
the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of
issues
related to
them.”
•
“[T]he
order to produce … chemical and biological agents has been
given”.
•
Intelligence
had confirmed that the Iraqi military had acquired mobile
facilities
to produce
biological agent.
•
“If Iraq
acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad we judge it would
take at
least two
years to make a working nuclear device. However, Iraq could
produce
an
improvised nuclear device within a few months but this would be
unreliable.”
322.
Addressing the
specific issue of the use of intelligence “about the
deployability
of CBW
within 45 minutes”, Mr Scarlett wrote in his minute to
Mr Blair in June 2003:
“This
intelligence came from a line of reporting judged to be reliable
and was
consistent
with standing JIC judgements it was included by the drafters
and
approved by
the JIC. It’s [sic] inclusion was not suggested by No.10. The
report
was highlighted
in the same terms in a JIC Assessment of 9
September.”152
323.
Mr Scarlett
added that the 9 September Assessment reflected other
recently
received
intelligence and that was “recorded in the dossier under the
heading,
‘Recent Intelligence’”.
324.
The JIC
discussed the dossier on Iraq in its meeting on 11
September,
including
that:
•
the
Committee’s authority would lend important weight to the
dossier’s
content and
enhance its impact; and
•
the dossier
needed to “convey accurately but dramatically the
rising
concern
about Iraq’s weapons programmes” and that recent
intelligence
had shed
light on progress since 1998.
325.
Mr Scarlett
wrote to JIC members on 10 September asking for comments
on
an additional
section which he had agreed with Mr Campbell “would be
considered for
inclusion
in the ‘dossier’”.153
It gave “an
account of the JIC assessment of developments
in Iraqi
WMD programmes since UNSCOM inspectors were withdrawn in late
1998”,
152
Minute
Scarlett to Prime Minister, 4 June 2003, ‘September 2002 Iraq
Dossier’.
153
Minute
Scarlett to JIC Members, 10 September 2002, ‘Iraqi WMD: Public
Presentation of
Intelligence Material’.
175