6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
50.
The Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment of 27 February
reached
the view
that, without direct intervention on the ground, the opposition
would
be unable
to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.
51.
If he was
unable to deter a US attack, Saddam Hussein would “go
down
fighting
and could adopt high risk options”.
52.
At the request
of the JIC, an Assessment, ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the Spotlight’,
was
produced on
27 February.26
It
addressed “Saddam’s threat perceptions and internal
position:
whether he is secure, what opposition he faces, and what he is
doing to try
and avoid
the internal and international threats he faces”.
53.
The Key
Judgements included:
•
“Saddam
fears a US military attack which would threaten his regime by
bringing
about the
disintegration of his military and security apparatus. A force on
the
scale of
Desert Storm (1991) would constitute such a threat.”
•
Saddam
Hussein would permit the return of weapons inspectors if
large-scale
military
action was believed to be imminent, but he would seek to
frustrate
their efforts.
•
“The
Special Republican Guard (SRG) remains closely tied to Saddam’s
regime
and is
likely to resist any attempt to overthrow him. The Republican Guard
…
would be
relatively resilient under attack but its loyalty in dire straits
is more
open to
question than the SRG. Other elements of the Iraq military are
more
liable to
crack if subjected to a strong attack.”
•
The
“opposition” was “militarily weak and riven by factional
differences. They will
not act
without visible and sustained US military support on the ground. A
coup
or military
revolt is only a remote possibility.”
54.
The JIC also
judged that Saddam Hussein did not believe such an attack
was
inevitable.
55.
Elaborating
the final Key Judgement, the Assessment stated:
“Overall we
judge that, unaided,
the Iraqi opposition is incapable of
overthrowing
the Iraqi regime; in the present circumstances a coup
or
military
revolt remains only a remote possibility. With outside
help short of
direct
intervention on the ground, the opposition would still be unable to
succeed.
Spontaneous
mass uprisings might be more important if the regime’s
control
wavered,
but this is not in prospect; however, it might hasten the regime’s
downfall
in conjunction
with a massive US attack.”
26
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Saddam Under the
Spotlight’.
183