The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Qadir told
the Council that he believed “the ISF would be able to run all its
own internal
security
operations by 2010, but would still need outside logistical support
until the end
of
2011”.
175.
On 27 August,
Mr Day wrote to Mr Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary
with an
update on
the legal framework for UK troops.65
He reported
that since Mr Prentice’s
meeting
with Prime Minister Maliki, “US/Iraq negotiations have become
increasingly
difficult
and seem to have reached an impasse”. Prime Minister Maliki was
reported
to have
“fundamental concerns over Iraqi sovereignty”.
176.
The key
outstanding issues were jurisdiction over MNF service personnel
and
timelines
for the withdrawal of combat forces. Mr Day said that UK
officials and lawyers
had been
undertaking the technical work to prepare for negotiations with the
Iraqi
Government,
but it was not possible to make substantive progress on the
drafting of a
UK/Iraq
framework before the final outcome of the US/Iraq process. That was
unlikely
before the
middle of September.
177.
Mr Day
considered that once US/Iraq agreement had been reached, it
should
be
“reasonably straightforward” to complete a draft UK/Iraq agreement
as a basis for
discussion.
The aim remained to reach agreement on text by the middle of
October,
in advance
of Prime Minister Maliki’s proposed visit to London.
178.
Mr Day
also reported that “If the US does not succeed it will focus on
trying to
renew the
current Chapter VII Security Council mandate”.
179.
On 29 August,
Mr Browne’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Brown’s
Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs with an update on the US proposals for military
transition
in southern
Iraq.66
Reports
from Iraq suggested that “the US military has become
reconciled
to the departure of UK ground troops from Basra by the end of May
2009”
and was
working to generate the forces they believed were needed as
replacements.
180.
Mr Browne
had agreed that “planning on the basis of the US
proposals
represented
a good opportunity both to meet the Prime Minister’s intent of
moving to
a
fundamental change of mission in the first half of 2009 and to
maintain our strategic
relationship
with the US”. Transition at the end of May would enable completion
of the
training of
14 Division and the handover of Basra Airport. The MOD would look
to make
reductions
in force levels before the end of May, but military advice was that
it was
unlikely to
be possible to make significant reductions before “we are able to
relinquish
core
functions to the US Brigade”.
181.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary also reported that contingency planning was
under
way in case
agreement could not be reached on a legal basis for UK operations
in Iraq,
and forces
had to be withdrawn sooner.
65
Letter Day
to Catsaras, 27 August 2008, ‘Legal Framework for UK Military
Presence in Iraq After 2008:
Update’.
66
Letter
Ferguson to Fletcher, 29 August 2008, ‘Iraq: Transition Planning
for 2009’.
410