1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
255.
Ms Short’s
Private Office wrote to Mr Sawers on 15 March recording that Ms
Short
“regrets
that DFID was not included”.139
She
welcomed the thrust of the new policy, but
remained
“concerned that insufficient weight had been given to …
humanitarian needs”.
She also
asked that, if the sanctions regime changed, any revised strategy
should take
into
account that: the UK could not “shrug off… responsibility” to
relieve the suffering that
Saddam
Hussein had caused; the UN might continue to have “an important
role”; and
that
provisions should be made for humanitarian assistance for the
Kurds.
256.
Ms Short wrote
to the Prime Minister on 1 April welcoming the review of the
“old
sanctions
policy which is widely discredited and is steadily eroding”, the
proposed
refocusing
on military controls, and that the OFF programme should end “except
for
Kurds in
northern Iraq”.140
Ms Short
stated that:
“To counter
[the] real risk that Saddam will neglect his people’s needs
we
should
promote openness and active role for UN agencies, Red Cross
and
NGOs
[non‑governmental organisations] in reporting on humanitarian
situation.
[The] UK should
be ready to play a leading role in holding Saddam to
account.”
257.
Following
the attacks on 16 February, US and UK aircraft carried out
no
further
attacks in the NFZs until 30 March.
258.
Mr Julian
Miller, Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary from September 1999 to
September
2001, wrote
to Mr Sawers on 30 March:
“Although
the operation of 16 February helped to reduce the qualitative
threat level,
coalition
aircraft have been threatened by AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] (and
less often,
SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles]) on almost every occasion that they have
taken to
the air. It
was against this background that US aircraft responded to Iraqi AAA
this
morning.
They released two weapons aimed at an air defence site in the
southern
No-Fly
Zone. Both missed their intended targets, landing in open ground
without
causing
collateral damage.
“The
Defence Secretary is satisfied that action remains necessary to
ensure that
the threat
to our aircrew remains acceptable. Given that Saddam’s intent to
attack
our
aircraft appears unchanged, we can expect – provided that targets
can be
identified
and that the weather permits their engagement – to see further
coalition
bombing
activity. Any such action will, of course, be conducted within the
existing
RO
framework, with the authority for UK participation – within the
carefully defined
parameters
approved collectively by Ministers – delegated to military
commanders.
139
Letter DFID
[junior official] to Sawers, 15 March 2001, ‘Iraq: New Policy
Framework’.
140
Letter
Short to Prime Minister, 1 April 2001, ‘Iraq Policy
Review’.
241