15.1 | Civilian personnel

Some secondees who had left after the attack on the al‑Rashid Hotel were returning,

but security was likely to get worse rather than better and required “constant vigilance”.

Communication from London to Baghdad and Basra, and with families in the UK,

was important.

246. Sir Michael Jay told the Inquiry:

“… some individuals … were rather more gung‑ho and rather more prepared to

take risks … Some of the DFID people were rather less used than those of us in the

Foreign Office or elsewhere, to be working in very difficult conditions. These were

completely understandable differences and they never became serious issues, as

far as I’m aware … They were the sort of things that I discussed with the Permanent

Secretaries concerned, so that we reached agreement on the right approach.

“… I do remember one or two conversations when some departments were less

willing than others to go out into the field. I think that’s inevitable …

“You have got to have … duty of care at the top of the agenda and you have

also sometimes got to say to people, ‘I know that you say you are willing to do that,

but if you get killed, your parents are not necessarily going to thank you for that or

thank us.’” 171

247. At the weekly meeting of Permanent Secretaries on 7 January 2004, Sir Nigel

Sheinwald stated that the next six months in Iraq were critical and that it was important

the UK maintained the quality of its secondees.172

248. The same day, a Treasury official advised Mr O’Donnell on the return of Treasury

secondees evacuated after the al‑Rashid bombing:

“Since the rocket attack on the al‑Rashid hotel … and subsequent incidents

and security threats the contingent of UK economists from HMT (and the Bank

of England) seconded to the CPA has withdrawn from Iraq. In part this reflects

concerns about the status of the accommodation on offer … it also reflects

family wishes …” 173

249. The official explained that the FCO’s conversion of the ground floor of a car

park into hardened accommodation was scheduled for completion by the end of

January. In the interim, in recognition of the critical importance of Treasury and Bank

of England secondees to the restoration of economic stability in Iraq, the UK military

had offered accommodation for up to three economists with “a solid roof and very good

‘point’ security”.

171 Public hearing, 30 June 2010, pages 62‑63.

172 Minutes, Meeting of Permanent Secretaries, 7 January 2004.

173 Email Treasury [junior official] to Perm Sec [Treasury], 7 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Secondees’ attaching

Paper, ‘Iraq: secondees’.

287