The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“The
conclusion is that the UK needs an all‑weather airborne UAV in
sufficient
numbers to
guarantee availability in operations of this nature.”
916.
In October,
there was a suggestion that the Apache attack helicopter
should
be deployed
to Iraq as an additional ISTAR asset but it was decided that the
attack
helicopter
programme was not of sufficient maturity and there was no
immediate
operational
requirement for such a measure.483
917.
In his
post‑operation tour report on 4 December, Major General William
Rollo,
GOC MND(SE)
from July to December 2004, wrote:
“There is a
constant demand across the Division for airborne imagery.
NIMROD
MR2 does an
excellent job, but it is in short supply due to a finite number
of
aircraft
and insufficient flying hours. P4 [Puma] is available and in high
demand,
but is
difficult to maintain and although there is a surge capacity to use
two, it is
constrained
by lack of spares. Phoenix can only fly from November to April due
to
temperature
restrictions. It is also restricted to rural areas. Predator is
technically
available,
but only if the division has a mission of sufficiently high
priority … This
means that
there is a continual shortage of overhead ISTAR within the
Division
resulting
in operations being planned around ISTAR availability, rather
than
ISTAR being
available for operations. There is a requirement for more
airborne
reconnaissance
platforms with greater endurance to allow for observation of
pattern
of life of
both people and places and to assist asset
tracking.”484
918.
On 22 February
2005, the MOD’s Directorate of Operational Capability
(DOC)
produced
its second volume of ‘Operation TELIC Lessons’, to cover the period
from
1 August
2003 to 30 November 2004.485
The preface
stated:
“Military
activities within a continuum of operations have varied widely,
but
after an
upsurge in the level of violence, the campaign has become a
unique
Counter‑insurgency
(COIN) operation – an evolution that fits no neat
recent
historical
or doctrinal model.”
919.
The report
highlighted ISTAR as one of the five key lessons for the Chiefs of
Staff
to
consider:
“Future
ISTAR procurement strategies should recognise the UK’s limited
capability
to find and
track targets, and obtain post‑attack Battle Damage Indications
from the
air,
particularly in urban environments and extreme climatic conditions.
This lesson
483
Minute
Harper to PJHQ ACOS J3, 20 October 2004, ‘Deployment of Attack
Helicopter for ISTAR role’;
Minute Fry
to COSSEC, 1 February 2005, ‘Deployment of Attack Helicopter (AH)’;
Report Rollo to PJHQ
MA to CJO,
4 December 2004, ‘Post Operation Report Operation TELIC 4/5 – 14
July – 1 December
2004’;
Minute DCDS(C) to COSSEC, 1 February 2005, ‘Deployment of Attack
Helicopter (AH)’.
484
Report
Rollo to PJHQ MA to CJO, 4 December 2004, ‘Post Operation Report
Operation TELIC 4/5 –
14 July
– 1 December 2004’.
485
Report DOC,
22 February 2005, ‘Operation TELIC Lessons Study Vol.
2’.
156