The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
“effects in the region of military action … without reasonable
cause and wide
international
support could be disastrous”;
•
that
“Western, and French, political and economic interests in the
Middle East
could
suffer irreparably”; and
•
the impact
on Muslims in France and the “potential for further
race‑related
275.
Sir John
commented that the UK should:
“… keep
hammering home to the key decision makers [in France] that … a
tough
resolution
now can really avoid military action – indeed it is the only way to
do so –
and thus
avoid the consequences they fear … At the same time we must
continue
to make the
intellectual arguments for action (Why Saddam? Why now? Why
does
deterrence
not work?);
“work … on
persuading the French that the Americans:
(a) have a
plan capable of quick military success;
(b) are
committed to seeing through the post‑military phase of
political
reconstruction
in Iraq;
(c) have a
plan for dealing with the wider repercussions in the
region.”
276.
In a separate
telegram, Sir John reported that President Chirac’s spokesman
had
briefed the
French press on 27 September about the President’s reaction to the
UK/US
277.
In a telephone
conversation with President Bush, President Chirac had
asserted
that France
“like the majority of the international community” favoured a
“two‑step
approach”;
and that France’s objective was disarmament of Iraq within the
UN
framework
and therefore the unconditional and immediate return of the
inspectors.
A simple,
firm resolution showing the unity of the Security Council and the
international
community
could help achieve that.
278.
Sir John
Holmes reported that the spokesman had also said that a telephone
call
to
President Putin the previous day confirmed that France and Russia
took the same
approach;
and that the French spokesman had quoted the Chinese Prime
Minister
as saying:
“… if
inspections did not take place, and there was no proof of Iraqi WMD
and
no authority
for action from the UN Security Council, there should be no
question
of
launching an attack on Iraq. The consequences of such an attack
would be
‘incalculable’.”
94
Telegram
562 Paris to FCO London, 30 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military action:
France’s Dilemma’.
95
Telegram
563 Paris to FCO London, 30 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Chirac’s
Reaction to the US/UK Text’.
250